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7Day One
The Plenary Session
Opening the session,  Dr. Ghia Nodia, the chairman of the Caucasian Insti-
tute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD), greeted the participants
of the conference, with a very special welcome to the foreign guests.
Dr. Nodia pointed out the outstanding contribution of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, singling out Mr. Chris Donnelly, Special Adviser for Cen-
tral and East European Affairs to NATOs Secretary General, and his office for
their contribution to the arrangements for the conference. Mr. Donnellys office
is making great efforts to extend the experience gained by western democratic
countries in the field of the organization of defense and security to former com-
munist countries. It was three years ago that the Caucasian Institute for Peace,
Development, and Democracy, first planned, with Mr. Donnelly, to hold this kind
of conference, but failed to carry it out due to the then unstable situation in Geor-
gia. The current situation is quite different and, therefore, a number of experts
from NATO member-states have honored us with their presence here to discuss
with Georgian specialists the ways through which Georgia is to solve key prob-
lems associated with national security. The conference has been sponsored by
NATO Office for Information and Press, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
The CIPDD, which has been directly involved in the organization of this
workshop, is a non-governmental organization. In the process of democratic tran-
sition, the society should develop a new perspective towards its own security
problems as well. The problems of state security represent quite a popular topic
in Georgia, and Parliament has dedicated much time addressing these issues;
thus far, however, these problems have almost been reduced to one issue  - under
whose or which influence should or should not Georgia be and, respectively,
which external force is to take care of its security. In our opinion, the proper
approach of a democratic society to security problems consists in our own care
for our own security. This does not imply that just one specially designated de-
partment of the government,  or the army, or the police should have sole respon-
sibility, but rather the entire society, including NGOs as well. It is our, i.e. soci-
etys, right to know how our government wishes to safeguard our society, in what
way it intends to build our security system, and how it disposes of the money
allocated for this purpose. It is our responsibility to consider these questions
instead of assigning them to someone else. And it is the purpose of this workshop
to discuss these issues.
The conference coincided with the visit of Russias Defense Minister, Mr.
8Grachev, to Georgia. Therefore, some government officials who were willing and
preparing to participate in it found themselves unfortunately unable to attend.
This involves a planned speech of a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at this
plenary session. Here is a vivid contradiction between theory and practice: we
are considering the concept of Georgias national security while they are design-
ing Georgias security, in reality.
Ms. Inna Lepel, the Deputy Ambassador of Germany to Georgia, expressed
the Embassys support of the objectives of the Conference and congratulated the
CIPDD for this initiative.
This is the first seminar which provides the opportunity to discuss the policy
of Georgias security. The participation of so many foreign quests and the fact
that the Georgian side is represented so well, is most impressive. The German
Embassy as a NATO contact point Embassy works on Georgias individual part-
nership program within the framework of the NATOs Partnership for Peace pro-
gram. Ms. Lepel pointed out Georgias success in democratic development which
has created beneficial external conditions for ensuring the countrys security and
re-establishment of its territorial integrity. The OSCE mission is ready to render
any assistance in achieving this goal as well. Georgias democracy, economic
reforms and financial security command the attention of the governments of the
North Atlantic Coordinating Council member-states and the OSCE. We do not
wish to strengthen the security of one state at the expense of others, neither do
we wish to see the re-emergence of new divisions between military blocks.
Dr. Wolfgang Manig, representing the Office of the Special Adviser for
Central and Eastern European Affairs to the NATO Secretary General, pointed
out that prior to working in  NATO Headquarters, he dealt with Georgias prob-
lems in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has been familiar with Georgia
since 1992. Comparing the situation in the country to that of those days, he
admitted that a lot of progress has been made, although the political environ-
ment still remains complex and the conflicts have not been resolved.
The present workshop will contribute to the development of a national secu-
rity concept. Although the discussions are for the most part going to be theoreti-
cal, practical examples will be given of the ways national security problems are
resolved in NATO. Comparing the experiences of NATO and the former Warsaw
Pact, we will see that the NATO member-state first develops its own security
concept and then tries to find a balance with its partners, while in the Warsaw
Pact all member-states had to comply with certain general directives. In the end
it is the Georgians that should find the ways for developing their own national
security themselves. No experts will be able to do that for them.
No security concept can be developed by a small circle of experts. At this
9stage our objective lies in facilitating the creation of a strategic community. The
same applies to the objective of this seminar. It is this community which will
develop the national security concept.
The first question is: what is a strategic community? The structure of the
former Soviet society was quite different. According to the Soviet military doc-
trine the General Staff was the brain of the Army and enjoyed a monopoly on the
resolution of military problems. The military developed the defense policy, while
the CPSU exercised control over the army and maintained its obedience. That
was not, however, truly civilian control since the Party lacked adequate military
expertise. The Politburo enjoyed privileges but it lacked necessary knowledge.
The KGB and the military together made the analyses of security issues. In theory,
the CPSU set military policy, but in fact the General Staff had the upper hand.
In any open society the army carries out orders, while the responsibility for
issuing those orders lay with the civil government. In the open society a defense
minister is to provide sound arguments justifying the share of the national in-
come to be used for defense purposes. In the open society the military should
prove that their demands are reasonable. It is the military that needs the partner-
ship of civil institutions - the government, media and academia. On their part,
civil servants should have a competent knowledge to provide adequate partner-
ship and be able to control the military. The members of respective parliamentary
committees should know how much a tank costs and to what extent and for what
purposes the given tank is needed. Maybe, some other equipment is better be
purchased instead? This question must be asked by politicians and not by the
General Staff.
The development of a strategic community is required so that civilians can
learn the particulars of military affairs. Far from including only current experts,
the strategic community shall comprise politicians, journalists, academicians. It
is highly commendable that we find representatives of all these circles at this
conference today.
The second issue to be addressed in this workshop is the essence of the na-
tional security concept. It is not a military doctrine. Security today is far more
than a purely military issue. The security system is not limited to the armed forces
only. It includes social security, the economy, civil society and internal stability.
In short, the problem requires a comprehensive approach. Moreover, the assess-
ment of risk and the elements which constitute an anticipated threat create the
basis of the national security concept. It is this assessment of risk that the armed
forces depends on.
Our seminar will also focus on assessing the standing of the armed forces in
a civil society. In our working groups we are going to discuss civil-military rela-
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tions, parliamentarian oversight, and political risk assessment.
This seminar cannot, however, provide final answers to all these questions.
The Georgian participants, in fact, are the experts. All we can do is help you to
identify the problems. I would like to repeat that the objective of our meeting
consists of bringing together the Georgian strategic community - the military and
the civilians. Foreign experts will make some introductory statements, present
the approaches of different NATO states to security issues which quite often
differ from one another. And it is up to the Georgians to assess which model can
best meet Georgias demands. Finally, we will discuss future plans. Debates with
regard to these issues should continue. We must develop specific projects for
further co-operation.
Mr. Lawrence Kerr, the deputy chief of mission of the United States, deliv-
ered  a statement from US Ambassador William H. Courtney, who was in Baku,
and unable to attend. Ambassador Courtneys statement was as follows:
The national security of a state is a broad concept, and depends on a range
of factors. These include democratic development, economic reform, the rule of
law, defense, and regional relations. From the US perspective, Georgia is gaining
in many areas. These positive trends differ from the experience after independ-
ence when civil conflict split apart Georgia, and in the process destroyed infra-
structure and delayed reforms. In many ways recovery since then has been re-
markable. Yet Georgia remains poor and vulnerable. Parts of the country -
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or the Tskhinvali region - are under separatist con-
trol. Adjaria lags in reforms, and the Azeri and Armenian enclaves exhibit some
unease.
Let us take a look at key aspects of national security, and see how Georgia is
doing in each category.
The first is democratic development. Elections for president and parliament
last November were relatively free and fair in most areas. They have enhanced
the legitimacy of Georgia as a state, and of the parliament and president, which
are among the most reformist in the New Independent States. Through open hear-
ings and new laws, parliament is laying a basis for deeper reforms and more
honest government. Internal tensions are lower than at any time since independ-
ence. Democratic changes are not threatened by hard-line minorities, communist
and nationalist.
Georgians are debating whether to establish federalism. Many democracies
have found that elected local governments decentralize decision-making and are
more responsive to the electorate. Local elections also help lessen separatism by
showing that local control over local issues is a reality. Many in the former Soviet
Union believe local elections can spur unrest or separatism. Our experience is the
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opposite. The civil rights movement in the 1960s reminded Americans that the
best way to lessen minority tensions is to seek to assure that everyone can partici-
pate in the democratic process on an equal basis.
A second area of national security is how economic opportunity makes a
state more stable and its people more prosperous. Georgia still faces weakness; it
will depend on humanitarian aid for another year or two. In the first nine months
of 1994, inflation averaged over 60 per cent per month - hyperinflation. But Geor-
gia gained courage to kill this decease, and did so faster than expected. The new
currency, the Lari, is stable, backed by tight monetary and fiscal policies. The
economy is beginning to rebound. Small business is now largely private.
Georgia is undertaking more economic reforms. With most industry in dire
straits, over 80 per cent of the economy derives from agriculture. Georgia will
benefit enormously if land can be freely bought, sold, leased, and mortgaged.
This will spur substantial private investment in the countrys rich agriculture po-
tential. It will also better enable minorities to protect their rights, just as private
land did in America after our civil war. Inefficient and corrupt state monopolies
burden economies. Their segmentation and privatization, as is happening with
Georgian bread corporation, is critical to future economic growth. Tax reform,
instituting moderate and predictable rates and a wide tax base, increases eco-
nomic opportunity by fostering investment and bringing more activity into the
legal economy. Tax reform enhances stability by making the tax burden fairer
and generating more revenues for legitimate government activities. Commercial
law and banking reforms are also valuable. These steps will help unleash private
investment to build a dynamic and productive economy. The World Bank, IMF,
USAID, EBRD, Germany, and the European Union, among others, are working
with Georgians in these areas.
Georgia has an ideal location and ports to transport and ship goods for an
entire continental area. A new Eurasian Corridor reaches from the Black Sea
across the Transcaucasus, the Caspian Sea by barge, and Kazakhstan and Central
Asia to China. Last year, tens of thousands of trucks crossed from Turkey to
Georgia. Many continued eastward through the Eurasian Corridor. This repre-
sents a phenomenal shift in transport patterns in just a few years. Railway and
truck transport from Russia to Georgia and vice-versa has dried up because of the
Abkhazia and Chechnya disputes. The Western oil pipeline, which America
strongly backs as one of multiple routes, will reinforce the Eurasian Corridor by
spurring competitive export routes for Caspian energy.
A third aspect of national security is the rule of law. In contrast to the early
post-independence years, the security situation is much better. After the bombing
attempt against Eduard Shevardnadze last August, the Mkhedrioni, an official
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but lawless gang, was finally neutralized. Streets and small businesses have come
to life, and people feel safer. Reform of law enforcement bodies, however, re-
mains a challenge. Human rights observance has improved, but more should be
done to protect detainees and assure that police functions are carried out under
the rule of law. Establishment of strong and independent courts is indispensable.
A fourth aspect of national security is defense. Georgias fledging military
was shattered by the defeat in Abkhazia. Since then progress has been made in
building a better force. A successful military must have professional skill and
discipline and be accountable to civil authority. Georgia is acquiring from Russia
military training and equipment. On a small scale, Georgia has begun collabora-
tion with others. We look forward to coast guard and other military cooperation,
including ship visits, the first of which took place last August. Our activities aim
not to supplant, but to complement Georgias ties with others. Any agreements
on military basing and other issues should be voluntary and mutually beneficial.
Georgia is becoming more active in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP).
Its Individual Partnership Program was signed in December. The door is open for
even more activities. In addition to encouraging cooperation on defense planning
and strategy, PFP addresses civil-military relations and the issue of civilian con-
trol over the military. Attention to these matters can bolster public support for a
sound defense posture.
A fifth aspect of national security is regional relations, a key factor in help-
ing Georgia to reestablish its territorial integrity. Through skillful diplomacy and
leadership, Georgia has developed good and balanced ties with its neighbors -
Russia and Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite some voices in the
Duma, Russian leaders seem to be searching for negotiated solutions to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Russia appears to be eager to reopen long-standing trade and
transport routes to Georgia and Armenia, closed since the Abkhazia war. Thus
far, however, Russia has not managed to induce separatist leaders to negotiate
realistically.
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States com-
prise the Friends of Georgia group on Abkhazia. Like other Friends, America
is looking at how the negotiations can be enhanced, with the United Nations
playing a leading role along with Russia. The Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe facilitates the South Ossetia negotiations. Russia and Geor-
gia bear the main responsibility for achieving solutions, but the Abkhaz and South
Ossetian separatists must act in good faith. Once solutions are found, interna-
tional participation in implementing them will be easier to obtain. A wide con-
sensus exists that solutions must be consistent with Georgias territorial integrity.
The safe return home of internally-displaced persons and refugees is a humani-
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tarian priority. Negotiated solutions are the best hope for this.
In conclusion, although Georgia still faces major separatist obstacles and
internal vulnerabilities, it has made notable gains. Democratic advances, eco-
nomic reforms, safer conditions, establishment of an independent military with
parliamentary oversight, and regional cooperation are all strengthening national
security. America strongly supports this progress. It is the best way to assure the
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Georgia.
Ambassador Dieter Boden , the Head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia pre-
sented his views on ethnic conflicts in Georgia and their relations to national
security issues:
The OSCE has been active in Georgia since December 1992, at the invitation
of the Georgian government. The principle objective of the Mission consists in
rendering assistance in the resolution of ethnic conflicts. It conducts its activities
mainly in South Ossetia, representing one of the five parties involved in the ne-
gotiations. The said five parties include two Georgian parties: Georgia and South
Ossetia, also Russia, North Ossetia and the OSCE facilitators. The OSCE also
participates in the settlement of the Abkhaz conflict along with the UN. At this
seminar Mr. Boden presented his personal consideration as an example of aca-
demic analysis of the situation.
What does Georgia need for defining its security policy? I think, at least two
things are required: first, Georgias interest in immediately resolving both con-
flicts and, secondly, a long term strategy for the prevention of such conflicts in
the future must be elaborated. As to the first question, OSCE cannot be ex-
pected to provide any ready-made concept for the resolution of the conflicts.
With both of the conflicts frozen, the immediate threat of military flare-up is
gone, but this does not minimize the urgent need to reach a political solution. A
conflict might heat up anew at any time as long as no agreed settlement exists.
Therefore, it is imperative to accelerate the process of political negotiations in
both conflict zones - South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At present we are at the
initial stage of such a process. As to South Ossetia,  we started a new negotia-
tion in October 1995 which will focus on confidence-building measures, then
proceed to the status issue. On Abkhazia, political negotiations it seems are in
a deadlock.
On thing, however, is clear: we need a sustained, conscious political effort on
behalf of Georgia who is the key party in both conflicts. OSCE can only act as a
mediator. In close co-ordination, we must develop creative, constructive ap-
proaches to the main political problems, including the status issue. Resources in
this regard are far form exhausted. Arranging football matches between Georgia
and North Ossetia and holding administrative meetings on practical problems in
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the border zone are certainly important, but they will not suffice. Also required
are fresh ideas on the future status of South Ossetia within the framework of the
Georgian state. There is little hope that a simple return to the past model will find
general acceptance. A new creative effort is needed to overcome the present situ-
ation.
There are those who allege that Russia is not greatly interested in the set-
tlement of Georgian conflicts. This argument certainly requires careful exami-
nation given the pivotal role that Russia is playing in the Caucasus. In fact we
may easily agree on the view that the settling of these conflicts will hardly be
possible without Russia. Some people tend to exaggerate Russias influence.
Russia may have security policy considerations of its own as much as Georgia
has specific security concerns. Both may not coincide in every detail. On the
other hand, there is definitely a large area of common interest. As much as
Georgia, Russia must be interested in the peaceful Caucasus and a speedy set-
tlement of conflicts in the region. It is imperative that this aspect is given deeper
consideration.
Let me now address the second point which I have made: the elaboration of
a long-term strategy. It implies the prevention of ethnic conflicts in the future. In
my judgment, and on this I share the opinion of my American colleague, Georgia
should remain a multi-ethnic state. As you are well aware eighty ethnic minori-
ties live on the territory of your state, among them such important communi-
ties as the Armenian and Azerbaijanian minorities. We agree with the idea
that this variety  of minorities which is one of the wealths of Georgia, should
be preserved. How is that to be safeguarded? The answer is both simple and
complicated: building a state with the rule of law, consolidation of demo-
cratic institutions, participation of all in the democratic process, strict pro-
tection of ethnic minorities and protection of peoples human rights in gen-
eral, will represent Georgia as a model of inter-ethnic co-existence and of
constitutional rule. All of this will contribute to making Georgia a stable de-
mocracy. This is my idea of a long-term strategy and I realize fully that the
task will not be an easy one.
Let me add that an encouraging process is already underway. The new Par-
liament has embarked on a multitude of key law projects, among them laws on
national minorities, on the creation of a Constitutional Court, and on an Ombuds-
man for human rights. This process has to be carried on and eventually include a
law on Georgias federal structural organization, which is still missing. It is here,
on the domestic level, where the future status for the now separatists conflict
areas South Ossetia and Abkhazia must be determined.
In conclusion, let me offer a few thoughts on the role international organiza-
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tions can play. As you know the OSCE and the UN are presently involved in the
settlement of conflicts in Georgia. Some might consider this interference into
your internal affairs. I certainly think that they are mistaken. Let us put a question
differently: is there any such thing as a pure national security policy today? I
believe there is not. On the contrary. What we have today is a still increasing
trend toward interdependence in interstate affairs, which consequently leads to
collective action in conflict management. Increasingly, we live in an age of com-
mon security. Therefore, a conflict in Georgia is not merely a Georgian problem,
but concerns the region, the continent as such. So international  organizations
justly consider themselves obligated to assist Georgia in the resolution of con-
flicts This is why OSCE has been invited to operate in this country, supported by
all of its 55 member states, among them Georgia and Russia as well.
Major General Valeri Chkheidze, Commander-in-Chief of the Georgian
Border Guards, was the sole Georgian state official who addressed the plenary
session.
The development of the concept and the system of national security is as
necessary and important an attribute as the Constitution and the involvement of
state institutions in this system. Georgia obtained its independence as a result of
the break-up of the Soviet Union but the concept and the system of the state
security has yet to be developed. For this purpose, the geopolitical condition of
the state, national and social conditions of its population, conflicts that emerge
on national, religious, social and other grounds should, by all means, be taken
into consideration.
Much has already been said of ethnic conflicts here and this is the very result
of the chain reaction caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. No protec-
tive instruments capable of halting ethnic conflicts had been developed by that
time. We often use the word separatism. This problem has acquired interna-
tional significance. Therefore, it is highly commendable that these issues are
considered at such a high level. The active involvement of international organi-
zations will greatly contribute to the neutralization of all the separatist move-
ments and, in the end, to the establishment of peace on all continents.
Separatism as a phenomenon always tends to narrow political visions, en-
courages political ambitions and provides a favorable ground for terrorism. In-
ternational terrorism has become a grave problem about which the world com-
munity is concerned. The development of political and state structures requires
scientific forethought and assessment, consideration of international traditions
and other aspects. It is necessary to develop such a concept of national security
which would cover all of these issues. This concept should comprise the protec-
tion of human rights as its major element. Today, this is the key point which takes
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the lead in the resolution of all problems whether foreign or domestic; the issues
related to defense, security, intelligence, counter-intelligence or social and eco-
nomic problems.
The key problem which Georgia faces consists in the complicated process of
developing new institutions. With regards to the protection of national interests
along the state border, I would say that any state begins at its border to safeguard
territorial integrity and national interests. This is one of the major principles
of the defense of state frontiers. Besides, the national security concept shall
provide a system which, along with other international institutions and or-
ganizations, will deal with all the problems in order to prevent the occurrence
of possible conflicts in the future. These can be domestic political issues,
foreign political, economic or any other kind of problems. It is necessary to
make a realistic assessment of the countrys potential. A specific and actual
direction of the process of co-operation and integration shall be defined dur-
ing the collaboration with international institutions and organizations. I share
the idea of one of the speakers that, unfortunately, old stereotypes remain,
and that some of us are yet mesmerized by Russias power. Democratic proc-
esses are taking place all over the world and gradually we are being liberated
from this hypnosis. Hence, the consideration of international practice would
be expedient; perhaps a strategic research center should be set up in our country
as well, which would provide our authorities with its perspectives, proposals
and predictions.
Given Georgias geopolitical situation, we have no right to disregard regional
issues. I myself have participated in three conflicts: in Afghanistan, Tskhinvali
and Abkhazia. No serious analyses or political assessments of these conflicts
have been made to this day. Perhaps this should also be considered and we can
work on it too. Five years is a short period of time for a perfect state structure to
develop. Seminars like this should, therefore, be regularly held, and we welcome
the opportunity to hear the estimations and proposals of conflicting parties. The
Department of Border Guards also has certain ideas. Of course, we do not claim
to possess an ideal vision of how things should be. I would, however, appreciate
it if the document outlining our concept could be examined by experts. Their
remarks and suggestions would be of great value.
In the end, the chairman thanked the speakers and the participants and ex-
pressed his confidence that Mr. Valeri Chkheidzes participation in the confer-
ence would contribute to the co-operation of non-governmental organizations
and state structures in security matters.
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The First Working Group
Topic: DEFENCE AND SOCIETY
Chairman - Dr. Alexander Rondeli
Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck opened the discussion.
Over the last decades the issue of defence and the society was alien to
Georgia, because defence policy was directed by the party and everything was
kept secret. Soviet society was only involved in defence issues in the sense that
it contributed to financing defense, and provided soldiers. Nobody explained to
people why any of it all this was. The society which cares about its defence
requires dialogue, and not the kind of dialogue in which one side says what is to
be done and the second side merely listens and implements the directives of the
first.
According to the experience of Western countries, the parliament is the meet-
ing place of the executive authorities and the public. It is here that defence issues
are addressed, and for this very purpose the so-called White Papers tradition
was developed. The White Papers determine the national security policy and
the principal directions of the development of the armed forces.
Herein, a concept is developed by the government and then submitted to the
parliament for consideration. It contains the state security situation and the analysis
of relationships with neighbouring countries. This document presents the situa-
tion with regard to the strategic powers of the region, relations with them and
describes the responsive actions in view of the possible changes in the regional
environment. It implies a description of the development of the countrys armed
forces, their financing, their structures, internal system of behaviour, their con-
duct. This document is to be considered by the parliament and made widely known
to the public. It is to be followed by the government and at the same time is to be
reviewed once a year, or once every  two years.
After  World War II, defence issues became less popular in Germany. The
government faced great difficulties in gaining public support for the re-establish-
ment of armed forces. The academic strata of society had a hostile attitude to-
wards the establishment of armed forces in Germany as well.
It is by the White Papers mechanism that you compile a reference book for
the parliament, as well as for academic and journalistic circles, by means of which
you inform the society of the state of affairs in the armed forces to which its
members are to be drafted.
The armed forces, their financing, and international agreements to which the
country is acceding, are still rarely discussed in Georgia. At the same time the
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security of Georgia largely depends on the involvement of international powers.
The Georgian authorities need public support for defence expenditures, and this
can be obtained only through transparency and accountability. To begin with,
Georgian White Papers can be non-governmental, since there still are a number
of problems which have been pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Border Guards today. To begin with, it can be a kind of discussion paper, which
may be produced by a non-governmental institute - like the one which has invited
us here today. Parliament, Society, as well as political and academic institutions
can gradually get involved in the discussion. This will help to clear the way for
the debates about defence and society.
The discussion is open. I would like to call on everyone to present his or her
ideas.
Janri Kashia: I think we should first of all address the society issue. There
was no society in the Soviet Union. The second should be the security structure.
We have to comprehend various aspects of security and their interrelation. The
security structure is a highly complex formation. It covers human rights, also
social, cultural, and state frontier security. At the same time we have to think of
the ways of safeguarding the security of any nation in the present open world.
Europe serves as a good example for realising what problems the transparency of
borders can create nowadays.
David Losaberidze: In any society, the establishment of a security system
and, in particular, the building of an army is connected with general conditions of
the society. In this respect the situation in the post-communist space is most
complex. The transition of the former Warsaw Pact member-states to a new, demo-
cratic system is greatly hampered by remnants of the old mentality. The situation
is particularly grave in the states that have emerged as a result of the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union. None of them with the exception of Russia had enjoyed
actual statehood, and at present are facing great difficulties in the development
of national security structures. With the old ideological base dismantled and the
societys poor knowledge of liberal values, nationalism has turned into a leading
ideological factor. This process has resulted in mono-national states, which have
been created most painfully.
In this respect, the Caucasus represents one of the most troubled regions.
Here the ideal of democracy appears to have substituted, to a certain extent, by
the nationalist idea which is a major unifying force. It can be said with certainty
that the process of the development of state institutions, including those of secu-
rity, has proved most successful in those countries which conducted it under the
banner of nationalism (the Baltic States, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Chechnya),
while in those countries, in which, for various reasons, the factor of nationalism
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was neglected (Georgia, Russia, Central Asian States) the development of the
security system has been delayed. And these are the countries that experience
permanent failures on foreign or domestic policies. The development of security
systems in newly emerged states to a certain extent depends on due application of
the factor of nationalism.
In conclusion I would like to stress that during the development of the secu-
rity system, the factor of nationalism cannot be discarded. The security system
on Central and Eastern Europe shall be guided by national state forces; and while
there exist serious contradictions among these states, any attempt to develop a
collective security system is to be considered most unrealistic.
Natia Tevzadze: An independent state requires the existence of various in-
stitutions and, in particular, the military. Like all over the post-Soviet space, solv-
ing this problem is far from a smooth process. Almost all of the characteristics of
an independent state, including the armed forces, had to be re-assessed. No na-
tional motive had ever been predominant in the former Soviet military. It was the
Communist, internationalist ideology that had always been most important. The
state consciousness of the former Soviet Union had always opposed national
consciousness since the Soviets had never been mono-national. That opposition
incited the annoyance of an individual, a citizen, and encouraged the avoidance
of military service. The break-up of the Soviet Union brought about a new stage
of building national armed forces. In Georgia, this process was accompanied by
internal unrest, civil wars and ethnic conflicts, in which Georgia got involved
without any trained army or any developed national security concept. There was
no civil society and the law on general military service was merely symbolic. The
situation was further aggravated by hard economic conditions. These new fac-
tors created new difficulties on the path of building Georgian national armed
forces. However, there was an encouraging feature as well - volunteering against
a background of challenges facing the nation.
I would like to point out another significant aspect in the establishment of
the armed forces - army authority and prestige. It is a good thing to be a soldier
when the state cares for you. It is a good thing to be a soldier when he serves the
interests of his homeland. But this service becomes unagreeable when the mili-
tary policy is of little importance to the state, when the economic situation is
grave.
The rudimentary Georgian Army failed to maintain the countrys territorial
integrity. This failure changed the Georgians traditionally favourable disposi-
tion to the military service and many young people chose to avoid the army - this
time with a new motivation: The state did not duly assess ethnic, territorial or civil
wars that we experienced. On the other hand, society was also at a loss, not
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knowing whether to call the fighters heroes or criminals.
No care was taken of the volunteers returning from conflict areas or for their
rehabilitation. The memory of those killed in the battles was not paid due atten-
tion. That is why military service has once again lost prestige in Georgia. A uni-
form state policy and a strong legislative and economic basis is required for im-
proving societys attitude toward military service. In my opinion, nationalism
will only assist in promoting military service, though it should be based on civic
rather than ethnic principle.
Charles Fairbanks: The prestige of military service is an extremely impor-
tant question in all modern countries. There is no state like Sparta in the world at
present. Even Israel is not like Sparta. Most of the people in modern societies no
longer lead a military life. Therefore, the military is becoming more and more
separated from civilian life. The end of the Cold War has made this situation even
more obvious. But the problem is far greater in newly emerged independent states,
in particular in Georgia, with a desperate lack of resources for armed forces.
Besides, under the Soviet rule military service was not a traditionally prestigious
profession in these countries, and the army in the minds of the people is still, to a
certain extent, associated with service in Soviet forces. Moreover, the events
which occurred some time ago in the same Georgia identified military service
with criminal activity.
If we move from the discussion of the problem to the discussion of possible
solutions, it should be pointed out that the western experience, where military
affairs are completely separate from those of the civilian, is less suitable for Georgia
and it will not contribute to raising the prestige of the military service in this
country. One of the reasons for this, among others, is lack of funds since Georgia
cannot afford to pay officers adequate salaries. I do not think that any Georgian
who has a chance of becoming a businessman or a scientist would rather become
an army officer. This is a problem of great importance to a country like Georgia.
Under the conditions of market economy and democracy no one, except for a
small number of patriots, will take up a military career. Therefore, we must con-
sider not only the establishment of a professional military service, which is so
often recommended to post-Communist countries by western experts, but of an
army which would attract middle class people on a part-time basis, so that while
being in military service, one is able to continue civil service as well. This princi-
ple is far less expensive and besides, a lot more people can be trained that way.
The post-Soviet states should pay more attention to this alternative.
Paata Giorgidze: I would like to return to Mr. Losaberidzes remark that
nationalism should constitute the basis of the state and its security system. This
kind of approach is unacceptable to me. A democratic state shall be open, this is
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what our foreign colleagues are recommending too. We should act in the interests
of a citizen and not in the interests of the state. In my opinion all of the institutions
dealing with security shall be developed on voluntary basis.
Temur Nergadze: At present the state is directly charged with defence and
the army-building, while the state itself is just starting to develop. The society
has but little influence upon the establishment of the army, which might be ex-
plained by the fact that the society has not yet developed either and the inter-
relation between the state and the society is still to be identified. We say that we
are building a civil society but it seems to me that we do not clearly understand its
essence. The issue of defence and the army in Georgia is further complicated by
the defeat suffered by our army. The army and the society are estranged. Some of
the fighters first got decorations and then found themselves in prison. This fact
occasioned the societys indifference to the army and thus the army failed to
become a part of the society. Acting in the interests of an individual is an inad-
missible luxury when building the armed forces. Some kind of equanimity be-
tween state interests and those of an individual shall be found.
Ambassador Wieck: Several speakers have pointed out that due to the ex-
isting gap between the Georgian society and the armed forces it would be more
advisable to establish a professional army of volunteers, which would exclude
the draft. In my judgment, this is too simple a way out of the too complex situa-
tion in which Georgia is found. At a time when the country is facing the task of
re-defining its own national identity, it is very dangerous to allow a complete
separation of the nation, the society and the armed forces. However, certain ef-
forts on the part of the society, for instance the introduction of the above-men-
tioned tradition of White Papers might relax this inter-estrangement.
Having a professional army is dangerous in a state which is in poverty and
thus cannot ensure the financing of its military, since under these circumstances
there is a danger that the armed forces could attempt to impose their own control
over the state. Therefore, I cannot agree with those who are of the opinion that
drafting is to be rejected due to the difficulties in the state and the society. It
would, however, be desirable to distinguish a nucleus of the armed forces which
could be used  in international crisis management on the one hand, and the na-
tional defence forces on the other, the objective of which shall be territorial de-
fence. This kind of a mixed system would link the principles of the draft system
with those of the professional army.
Friedrich Kriesel: I would like to strongly support Ambassador Wiecks re-
marks. In Germany we have a conscript army and it is necessary for maintaining a
contact between the army and the entire society. Under these conditions, the
opinion of the army and the perspectives of the military reflect the perspectives
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and the opinion of the entire society. A conscript army is of great importance to
your country. You have experienced a civil war; you have ethnic minorities. It is
very important that through conscription your army will include the representa-
tives of all the ethnic minorities, while you will never be able to achieve that with
a wholly volunteer army. In my opinion the army in your country can be an exam-
ple, a school of the co-operation of different ethnic groups. After the re-unifica-
tion of Germany the army played an important role in bringing together and ad-
justing the consciousness and views of the East and West German populations. I
am not an American, but I would like to point out that the American armed forces
have played a similar role. They have provided the representatives of various
races and ethnic groups with the opportunity to establish close links and make
their career on an equal basis.
Edward Rogers: I fully agree with the remarks of Colonel Kriesel and Am-
bassador Wieck. You are on the crossroads now. The present situation in Georgia
must be changed. If you maintain the conscript notion you will have to improve
the soldiers living conditions, take care of their families. If you introduce the
principle of volunteering, you will have a much smaller army but you will have to
pay them well. In an ideal case, you will have a situation like the one in Germany
with the citizen-soldiers principle. After the Vietnam war we, in America, faced
the problem of the army being discredited and we shifted to the principle of
volunteering. At the same time the army provided representatives of the lower
classes the chance of being trained and educated. And after they complete mili-
tary training, they return to the society better skilled and educated. Georgia must
hold a public discussion as to the possible directions of the development of its
armed forces.
Lawrence Kerr: I would like to say a few words about war funding organi-
sations and their relations to society and culture. Today there are talks in Europe
about the end of wars and history in general. They say that democratic countries
will never declare war on one another. In the previous speech my German col-
league noted that if you have a modern army, it could participate in international
peacekeeping operations. This is where the world is going. But we must remem-
ber that in this region we are dealing not with the end of history but with its
middle. This region has missed a very important period of development - from
the end of the 18th century til now. The present stage of Georgias development
is analogous to the bloodstained past of Western and Central Europe. This is a
dangerous time, the time when the army is considered to be a badly needed insti-
tution for national survival. Not long ago, there were clan and village armies in
Georgia, i.e. armies usually organised around a clan, an ethnic group, village (or
villages), or around some concrete individuals. World history has given a number
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of examples of this type of army or para-military force having successfully fought
in various battles, as was the case during the Civil war in America, when different
armies fought on the side of the confederates. They were not united by a myth or
an idea coming from the Centre. Every one of them had its own myth for which
they fought. However, during the war against Japan the Americans put aside all
regional differences and shared the central myth.
What is a Georgian myth around which a Georgian army can unite and fight?
Georgia needs a new set of multi-ethnic heroes. The army also needs them. One
of the key functions of the Georgian army should be its ability to unify the coun-
try. I joined the army before the war in Vietnam started and I witnessed the in-
tegrating role of the army there. People from Iowa who had never seen a Negro
before were meeting people from Philadelphia who had seen very few whites.
People, who had known Jews only by hearsay, now met them face to face - and
had a nice time with them.
In short, the development of a Georgian army needs a central myth of what
Georgia represents today. This myth shall integrate in itself ethnic, cultural and
regional diversities of Georgia.
Kashia: I think it is wrong to consider Georgia a particularly multi-ethnic
country. Making an emphasis on the multi-ethnicity of Georgia is a common
mistake of the West. We have to speak of the civil society and the solution of
security issues in the process of its development. If we go back to Stalins ethno-
centric concept we will never end the deadlock. I would like to stress that Geor-
gia is the unity of citizens. Peoples of all the nationalities are first of all citizens
of Georgia. The development of the security concept also requires the considera-
tion of the principles of a civil society. If we consider Georgia a certain multi-
ethnic formation, then neither the army nor life, in general, will have any sense
whatsoever.
Lawrence Kerr: I am an American and I come from a multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural society and when I referred to culture as being multi-ethnic I meant it as
a compliment. If we have a national character it has been developed through the
reciprocity of various nationalities. I would also like to say that I have spoken as
an interested person and a scientist and not as a government official. And, in
general, whatever we say or think shall be based on the realities of the time.
Giorgi Khutsishvili: The security of Georgia lies in the system of state and
social guarantees; it is the state of the society, when every individual, living on
the territory of Georgia, the states spiritual and material values, territorial integ-
rity, constitutional system and sovereignty are protected. Abkhazia is an insepa-
rable part of Georgia and in the process of developing the security concept, the
interests of all the people living there must be taken into consideration. I think we
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should reject the practice of telling soldiers they were the soldiers of the Georgian
National Army. This has a different impact on any soldier of non-Georgian ethnic-
ity. His attitude towards military service will be entirely different if he is told that he
is a citizen of this country and the army belongs to the State and not to any
particular nationality. There were talks here about civil control and social relations.
In the present situation it would be wrong to give up conscription. It should be
pointed out that the principle of volunteering is also observed in the Georgian
army. The majority of our citizens - who are no military experts - join the army with
great enthusiasm under the pressure of present economic hardships. Unfortu-
nately, they have not got the makings of good officers, and the deficiency of
professionals is one of the most critical problems of our armed forces. This defi-
ciency is so great that we find it difficult to even talk about building the armed
forces.
Social links with the army are quite close, since every one of us has a relative
or a son in the army. So the interest in the army is not shallow, though the aca-
demic circles show but little interest in it. The co-operation of the parliament
with military structure can be considered a remarkable example of the exercise
of civil control. All of the laws or important decisions are adopted through this
co-operation.
It is particularly difficult to speak about nationalism and patriotism. Maybe,
our concepts of nationalism are not uniform. In my opinion nationalism should
refer to the State. The issue of confessional relations is also very complex. Since
Christianity has not been declared a state religion, all the representatives of dif-
ferent confessions in the army have, to a certain extent, found themselves in
equal conditions. There are over 50 different confessions in Georgia and there-
fore we need serious recommendations as to what kind of work should be carried
out in the army in this respect. Low political culture is another key problem in our
army. While developing a security concept we should consider a kind of structure
which will be the bearer of the State policy in the army.
Nino Nanava: Mr. Lawrence Kerr has stated that we have lost the image of
a hero, a mythological image which unifies the nation. In this respect I would like
to cite Samuel Huntingtons words: the development of a national security con-
cept and powerful state structures calls for the existence of a charismatic leader.
This was the situation in Georgia under the reign of Queen Tamara. Today we
have neither a leader nor an idea to unite the entire Georgia. People have to find
the way out of the situation by themselves. What we need is the efforts of the
society; no leader is going to help us unless and until the national idea is per-
ceived by the society.
Ambassador Wieck: I would like to return to the issue of maintaining control
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over the armed forces. Let us consider presidential control. In Georgia, the presi-
dent is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He is also vested with executive power.
However, the Constitution restricts and is to restrict this power.
In a presidential system the parliament constitutes the major means of con-
trol. It is the parliament which approves the appointment of high military offi-
cials. It is the parliament which approves the defence budget, and it is important
that the budget is detailed and has been considered by the defence and budget
committees in advance. If the budget is too general and contains only the amount
of money to be allocated and the number of soldiers in the army, the executive
power and the defence ministry get an unlimited authority to spend funds for this
or that purpose.
In my country, civil control is usually referred to as the political control, and
covers three vast areas. The first is the money, which is allocated for the arma-
ment. The second area is the prerogative of legislators to approve or reject a
nominee to a military post. The third is the use of armed forces in war, peace or in
a crisis.
Fairbanks: What I have to say might be unconventional, but if we take a
look at the recent history of Russia we may find a potential danger in the notion
of civil control. This is the view of the Russian intelligentsia, which considers
that the use of armed forces in October of 1993, and in Chechnya today, served
and is serving personal, rather than national interests. Therefore, we must make
sure that the civil control over the military does not lead to the willful use of
armed forces by the politicians.
Guram Manjgaladze: At the end of January 1996, a representative of the
Georgian Ministry of Defence reported at a special meeting that the 1995 draft
had been successfully carried out. However, he also pointed out that out of the
planned 80,000, only a small part had been drafted. It was also said that our
military registration and enlistment offices and military-medical services were to
be changed, since their methods were remnants of the Soviet period. The multi-
national and multi-confessional composition of the army greatly complicates
military service today. Besides, a great number of rank and file are from low-
income families of workers and peasants. We greatly suffer from the deficiency
in officers; we have no officers experienced in the issues of morale and ideology.
In all of the armed forces all over the world, many funds are expended on moral
and ideological training, while with us, posts of this kind are either entirely va-
cant or staffed with unskilled personnel.
The topic of desertion was also discussed. This is the most critical problem
for the Georgian army. There are many reasons for this, but one of the most impor-
tant is the very low level of discipline in the army.
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David Darchiashvili: I would like to draw your attention to one aspect of the
civil control which was discussed by Ambassador Wieck. It refers to the instru-
ment of approving the defense budget. Georgias defense budget is far behind the
analogous expenditures of other countries, and yet, it amounts to 50 million dol-
lars. Therefore, its effective expending is of great importance. The Georgian parlia-
ment has recently approved a new defense budget, but the way of its approval or
the structure of the budget itself cannot be considered an example of civil control.
The budget consisted of just a few items. It said that a certain part of the total
amount was to be spent on wages, another - on the equipment. There was an item
called other expenditures, which contained several millions but nobody knew
what other expenditures meant. A legislative body should have demanded a
more precise explanation. I know, I will not sound too original to say that the
detailing and the efficiency of the budget would further the security as well as the
harmonizing of military-civil relationships.
Nergadze: In the Newly Independent States, the security issue comes to the
foreground. But the national security concept and its system cannot be devel-
oped without the consideration of this states global objectives and the relation-
ship of this state with the outside world. Only after this kind of document is
developed will it be possible to speak of any parliamentarian or social control
over the defense institutions, to determine whether the funds, allocated for  defense
are sufficient or not, and whether they are expended properly.
Thus, no control can be exercised without first identifying global and spe-
cific objectives of our state.
Herman van der Weijden: I also think that you should first formulate your
message to the society, and next,  actuate the mass-media - then arrange a public
discussion. In a democratic country mass-media statements are of political ex-
pressiveness. When developing the national security concept, discussions shall
be held with all of the political parties or with the participation of their majority.
Later on a political message to the public is to be formulated and the entire soci-
ety is to be involved in the discussion on security issues. Remember that infor-
mation messages bear political responsibility.
Rogers: There are too many critical remarks with respect to the Georgian
government at this conference, and most of the criticism comes from Georgians
themselves. I would like to remind you of some remarkable achievements. The
struggle for democracy has proved to be very painful. Elections, however imper-
fect, have still been held. Certain advancement in the economy is remarkable.
The country has managed to develop working relations with all of the powers
represented in the region, be it Turkey, Iran, Russia, NATO or other neighbours.
During my meetings with your minister of foreign affairs and other diplomats, I
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have felt that Georgia is anxious to develop the concept of its own national secu-
rity and to have the freedom of its development without any external pressures.
Although all of this does not always appear in writing, this is what your diplomats
are constantly thinking about. And so my last question is: is it impossible to
develop Georgias national security system which will be free from any kind of
external pressure?
Kriesel: One of our Georgian colleagues has referred to the issue of deser-
tion. Unfortunately, he has not elaborated this idea. I think if there is no national
concept from which a security concept could be derived, we should consider the
reasons for desertion. And that will constitute the basis for any further considera-
tion of what the Georgians really want, what kind of national security concept
could be suitable for them.
Gela Khutsishvili: I must state that the problem of a willful desertion of the
army is gradually slackening. Do not forget the five years we have gone through.
Our armed forces have been developing under the conditions of ethnic conflicts
and the opposition of various groups within our society. Old values were being
re-assessed while the new ones had not been yet established. The new generation
appeared ill-prepared for the military service. As for the social and cultural con-
ditions in the army they are no different from the present conditions in general. It
is necessary to develop a solid legal framework and the state military system in
consideration of the Georgian mentality. Unfortunately, lack of professionalism
is notable in all the areas of State development.
Second Working Group
Topic:BUILDING AN ARMY
IN AN ECONOMICALLY WEAK
COUNTRY
Chairman - Ghia Nodia
Kenneth Brower opened the discussion:
It is quite feasible for a small country to have relatively powerful military
forces. However, for the time being, Georgia has not got adequate funds to
invest in military forces. The countrys resources do not yet enable it to produce
or purchase adequate quantities of high quality military equipment.
The resources allocated by any country to its self-defence consist of both
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manpower and capital. In the NATO member-states only 2 to 10 percent of 18 to 38
year-old males are utilized by the military services during wartime. This is because
some of them are large countries which did not deploy adequate conventional
forces. By comparison to the NATO countries Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Sin-
gapore and Israel utilize up to 100 percent of the males of the same age in a state of
emergency. What does this mean? Following NATO manpower practices, a coun-
try with the population of five million people could mobilize only 60 thousand for
wartime military service, while in reality, well over 550 thousand can easily be
mobilized out of 5 million people. This is a great force. The defence issue is not
seriously addressed by the European members of NATO, because they consider
American nuclear weapons their warrant. They allocate between 2 to 2.5 percent of
their gross national product to defence, while the USA allocated 5 to 6 percent
during the Cold War. In some countries, for instance in the Soviet Union, the
country itself served the army and not vice versa. But in general, in many other
countries more than 5 percent of the gross national product is allocated to national
defence, and still their economic results are good. The Israeli defence budget
currently amounts to 9 percent of its GNP. Georgia currently lacks financial re-
sources but possesses sufficient manpower for self-defence.
There exists a ratio between the total replacement value of a countrys cur-
rent military inventory of armored vehicles, artillery, aircraft and ships and its
annual defence budget. This ratio is between one to two for the NATO countries.
If the military budget amounts to 1 billion dollars, the replacement cost of the
inventory of major weapons should be 2 billion dollars. However, this ratio is
much higher in Israel, since this country has obtained a proportion of its equip-
ment free of charge. Therefore at present the replacement value of its inventory
of major weapon systems amounts to 6 billion dollars, for each one billion of its
defence budget. Hence, if we know the annual defence budget amount we can
easily define how many tanks, aircraft, guns or ships a given countrys inventory
can include.
However, we face another problem, that of the rapid advancement of tech-
nology. Today, in combat a bad tank is a dead tank, an old aircraft - a mere target.
The result of the USSR-USA competition in combat aircraft since 1977 is ap-
proximately 165 to 1, which means 165 Soviet-made Syrian, Iraqi or other air-
craft shot down for the loss of 1 American made aircraft. Therefore, it does not
make any sense to procure obsolete equipment. The Iraqi armed forces were the
fourth in the world in size but they proved just a target for America. If you wish
parades, purchase the scrap which create illusion and impress those who lack
knowledge. However, the majority of soldiers are realists and illusions will not
protect you from them.
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What does all this mean for Georgia? It can only have one way out. No other
alternative is feasible. During my visits to the Baltic States I said that a poor
countrys defence problem should be resolved through the use of a small cadre of
professional personnel and a conscription-based reserve system, similar to that
of Sweden, Switzerland, Israel and Singapore. Everyone shall be subject to con-
scription. However, the goal should not be to generate a large standing army, but
rather to train individuals and generate unified, coherent reserve formations whose
members will serve in the same units for the next 20 years. As a result Georgia
will get a layer-cake-like military structure. The upper layer will comprise young
fit people - the commandos. The next layer will also consist of relatively young
people, but perhaps married ones with families. They will make up efficient first
line units capable of regional defence. In the end, aged people can defend various
buildings and facilities. The same kind of division of individuals can also be
applied to their equipment. The best personnel shall be equipped with the best
weapons. This is the way the military is organized in Finland. The best units are
equipped with 700-dollar rifles, while the oldest reserves use 35-dollar Chinese
rifles. The Lithuanians have preferred to buy one new gun rather than twenty old
ones, but this does not make sense and is a tremendous mistake.
When, despite the lack of financial resources for air forces, air defence forces,
or funds for armoured fighting vehicles, you still attempt to purchase these sys-
tems, you will receive only low quality technologies. You will turn your armies
into nothing more than targets. For Georgia it is the land forces that are of vital
importance. They do not require vast funds if they are based on high quality light
infantry. You cannot follow Russias example. Russian infantry is only capable
of fighting at the platoon level, while you need infantry fighting at the fire team
level within squads, as it is practiced within NATO and as the Finns fight in
forests. God has provided you with mountains and no tank can climb up a diffi-
cult mountain.
My argument is very simple. My concept for Georgia consists in a profes-
sional cadre, conscription-based reserve light infantry, citizen-soldier military.
Now the floor is yours.
Ivliane Khaindrava: I would like to know whether the ratio between the
downed American and Soviet aircraft would have been the same if the latter had
also been manned by American pilots.
Brower: 20 years ago I was also of the opinion that it was the pilots that
mattered first. Since then, I have changed my mind. The MIG-29 is a remarkable
aircraft but it has too many buttons in the cockpit. Its situational awareness is
unacceptable. At present, electronic technology has a lead in air-to-air combat,
and if you want to win you should have electronics of high quality. However, this
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is extremely expensive, and one should be realistic about it. A F-16 Falcon fighter
costs 20 million dollars. With spare parts test and maintenance equipment, train-
ing simulators and weapons the price doubles. A good pilot should make at least
180 flight hours a year. An F-16 aircraft burns 1,000 gallons of fuel per hour. The
fuel costs 5,000 dollars an hour at European oil prices. If a pilot flies less - he is
doomed. But fuel cost is nothing compared to that of the weapons themselves!
A small country can afford to purchase guns, radio transmitters, light mor-
tars and anti-tank weapons. Victory for a small country means the avoidance of
defeat. A small country should avoid any decisive combat with the enemy and
should maintain its communications open to the outside word.
In any military service, a truthful and good relationship between an officer
and a soldier play a powerful role.
Unidentified participant: It is clear that a small country should concentrate
on light infantry formations. But how should they man the army? Is it better to
form small units on the basis of the principle of professionalism or a conscript
army of 30-40 thousand?
Brower: Neither. A small army is inadequate in wartime. I do not believe in
a regular army for a country like Georgia. The standing army is a preparatory
school in small countries. It is the reserve which is the real military force. All of
the conscripts should be trained well. I understand that every commander-in-
chief needs an operational force. For this purpose an 18-month conscription will
probably suffice. During the first six months a soldier is trained individually, the
next six months are devoted to training in a military unit and during the remain-
ing six months the newly formed unit will be in the commander-in-chiefs opera-
tional service. Then the soldier and his unit will pass into the reserves but he and
his unit will be replaced by a new one. This is a continuous chain, and in 5-6
years there will be a high-quality army consisting of many cohesive reserve units.
Zaza Pataridze: We are interested in the example of those countries which
are at the initial stage of building their armed forces. We must determine what
kind of army we need. For this purpose we must establish a regulatory base: the
security concept, the military doctrine. And it is these documents with which the
defence budget should correlate later on. If the state has not got financial re-
sources, alternative means should be procured. Our military registration and en-
listment offices are the remains of the Soviets in which corruption is predomi-
nant. We need to introduce an alternative service. The establishment of a mili-
tary-industrial complex is necessary as well. The fact is that Russia has not given
us anything. If we wait for Russia, we will have an army without any armament.
Brower: Israel and Singapore are the most interesting examples from the point
of view of building an army from an initial stage. Singapore started to build up its
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armed forces in 1963 without any foreign financial aid. In 1956, Israel only pos-
sessed 100 aircraft and 300-400 tanks. Besides, even in 1956 most of its equipment
was outdated. But it is the system that matters, not the armament, for the system
permits systematic growth.
The Singapore example was not followed by the Baltic states. They have not
set up appropriate ministries of defence and adopted appropriate legislation.
Georgia needs just Xerox copies of these Singapore documents. If it follows my
advice the army will be built according to the principle of an upside-down pyra-
mid. Georgia start with a small nucleus and in 20 years you will have a 500, 000-
men reserve. And I hope you will also have the money by that time to equip this
force with first class weapons.
Kakha Katsitadze: The Center for Economic and Social Research which I
represent has developed a draft of Georgias military doctrine. We agree with Mr.
Brower. Georgia has joined the CFE Treaty. It cannot deploy more than 220 tanks,
the same number of armoured vehicles, 50 helicopters and 100 combat aircraft.
These numbers is so scanty that it is not worth purchasing outdated equipment.
Wed better think of procuring high-quality equipment even if it delays the entire
process.
Brower: The inventory of equipment you have described has a replacement
value of well over 3 billion dollars. In NATO this amounts to an annual defence
budget of at least one and a half billion dollars or, even following the Israeli
example, 500 million dollars a year. Equipment lasts on the average perhaps 20
years. But in the West only about 20% of the annual defence budget is allocated
to the procurement of major weapons. It will not be economically feasible to
build your own weapon system in small quantities, so your armored vehicles,
aircraft and helicopters will have to be imported at an annual cost of over 150
million dollars a year. The brutal economic truth is that Georgia cannot afford
even a minimal amount of high-quality equipment. The CFE Treaty sets material
inventories that you cannot afford. That is the simple truth you must face. Very
small quantities of high quality equipment are unaffordable and militarily mean-
ingless. Remember that 3 billion dollars is Georgias entire GNP for three years.
Katsitadze: But this is a program calculated for 10-15 years.
Brower: In 10 or 15 years, a tank may not be required at all. All outdated
equipment will become obsolete by then.
Katsitadze: We may purchase new weapons in small lots.
Brower: If the lots are too small, purchasing loses its sense. And your entire
military budget would today purchase only one F-16, but no fuel for fly it, and no
weapons for it to use. Georgia must face financial reality.
Katsitadze: The second issue I wanted to mention is political. It refers to the
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officers cadre. This issue has not been discussed in public. A substantial number
of the officers comes from the Soviet Army and their quality is low. Officers
training takes time. Therefore, the provision of security within the transition pe-
riod is a great challenge.
Brower: The situation with you differs from that of Singapore. They ac-
quired officers from England and Israel on a contractual basis. At the same time
it is common knowledge that a volunteer, clever patriot is often capable of doing
far more than a professional foreigner. Personally, I believe enthusiastic ama-
teurs are preferable to well educated professional officers for newly emerging
countries. In my judgment officers who grew up in a different culture are victims
of paradigm paralysis.
Ioseb Barnabishvili: Unfortunately we are building a low-quality army af-
ter the Russian model. I have my own doctrine of building a Georgian army which
I would like to share with you.
At present the law on universal military service is in force in Georgia. There
are roughly 300 thousand conscripts who should all be drafted according to this
law. However, all we need is 30 thousand. Therefore, we can draft only every
tenth of the available conscripts and employ the rest in an alternative service.
They will pay a military tax, but it will be the State that will profit rather than an
individual commissar (head of a call-up station). Those who can afford will
pay in cash; those, who cannot will pay the tax through physical labour. Later on,
they will all be enlisted in the reserve as private soldiers, while the selected ones
will make up a professional army. If three hundred thousand conscripts bring in a
thousand dollars each, the State will procure three million dollars. This amount is
already presently expended on corruption.
If my concept is implemented, the conscripts will be found and the needed
3,500 dollars for each of them will be procured. A conscript will be admitted into
a training centre. A special instructor will be in charge of ten conscripts. Maybe
three of them will not keep up and refuse to continue the service. But the remain-
ing seven are sure to complete the course. All of the graduates will continue the
service in a military unit and later on will train the reservists themselves. In this
way Georgia will build up its own armed forces by itself.
Lawrence Ghesquire: In almost in all countries, military service is compul-
sory. Military taxation or the principle of recruitment is unjust. It practically means
that the poor should fight and the rich should not. Equality is a must. For in-
stance, in Switzerland it is considered an insult not to be drafted.
Brower: During the American Civil War, the practice of acquiring an ex-
emption from the army by paying a special tax almost caused a rebellion. I believe
imposition of a military tax is undemocratic and morally wrong. It places a wealthy
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individual in a privileged position. I am not a sociologist but I would say that
national military service can help shape a nation. It unifies the nation. The Finns
and the Swiss are proud of being soldiers. In Israel those who were released from
the army often left the country for shame.
Ghesquire: I will speak about the principles of making a military budget. It
is connected with the determination of expenditures. No budget can be deter-
mined without knowing what you want. First you have to decide what kind of
armed forces you need and this should be calculated for 10 years. Then all of this
shall be converted to monetary terms. This includes the infrastructure, service,
displacement and all the rest, which we often forget. A defence budget should be
determined like a family budget. Permanent expenses and the costs of desirable
goods shall be defined and all this shall be correlated to the income and priorities
shall be identified. A defence budget shall be accessible to the public. How we
manage to do that is another issue. Everything should be estimated for a long-
term period and we have to know what the GNP will be in 10, 15, or 20 years.
Briefly, the main thing is to identify general priorities which is quite difficult
in itself. A budget is but an identification of priorities and correct planning. This
is the technique of budget-making.
Besik Aladashvili: We must first note the difference between Georgia and
Israel or Singapore. Unlike them we are very weak economically, while defence
industry cannot be imagined without an economic basis. Moreover, we will not
be able to solve economic problems without an army either. I mean the defence
of our territorial integrity. In short, this is a kind of vicious circle. We have to
decide what is better: to depend on free but old weapons as we currently do, to
purchase them or to produce our own.
Brower: When I speak about the Israeli model, I do not at all mean that you
will have 500 modern aircraft, 4,000 tanks and so on. The main thing is philoso-
phy here: the principle that sweat does not cost any money. You can follow other
countries in infantry formations. Training a good soldier requires just 800 bul-
lets. A conscript in Israel gets 25 dollars monthly. Georgia does not need more
than 2-3 thousand professionals. The salary of a conscript shall differ from that
of a professional.
Irakli Melashvili: It was a mistake on Georgias part to confine itself to the
above-mentioned three ways of building its defence system. We did not deter-
mine our potential accurately. There were some areas which we could have un-
dertaken. Any plant in the Soviet Union could easily change over to military
production. We could also have managed to produce individual weapons without
any problems. Relevant documentation was available at the plants.
Georgia has lost four years. We have concentrated upon receiving actually
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obsolete weapons from Russia. Mr. Brower is right. We have procured scrap. Late
as it is, we have to assess what we can and cannot afford. It is a crime to purchase
high cost military uniforms in Russia while we can produce them ourselves much
cheaper. We have to determine what we can purchase, what we can produce and
what to take as a present.
Mamuka Tsurtsumia: It is true that the Iraqi outdated weapons were but a
target for America, but to what extent will our outdated weapons be a similar
target for our neighbours? Sooner or later we will have to fight. I cannot agree
with Mr. Brower - outdated weapons will also be useful to us. In the 1930s
German officers were trained on dummy tanks, while Israel still uses Soviet T-
55-s.
Brower: Israel uses T-55s as armoured vehicles and not as tanks. Suppose
you are given tanks free of any charge today, who is going to repair them in three
years? The Ukraine deploys 4,500 tanks. Their maintenance alone will ruin their
budget. Whenever you procure military equipment free of charge, you should
first consider what your economic and military potential is going to be in five
years. However, I agree that even outdated weapons and equipment will do for a
small-scale war against an equally ill-equipped opponent. Still I prefer very high
quality infantry in your terrain to very low quality armor.
Third Working Group
Topic: NATIONAL STRUCTURES
OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
Chairman - Ghia Nodia
Kenneth Brower began the discussion.
He presented some international models of the military command and control
system which differ from one another according to the division of responsibilities.
The first model is an internal balance of power such as is practiced in Saudi
Arabia. The King there is the commander-in-chief and his brothers have their
own armies. The second model is control by dictatorship. This system exists in
Syria and Iraq. The commander-in-chief, the defence minister, the chief of gen-
eral staff are from the same clan or town. The third model is the constitutional
monarchy where a king or a queen is the commander-in-chief. In peacetime there is
a united staff headed by the prime minister whose policy is implemented by the
minister of national defence. The fourth model is the constitutional dictatorship,
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an example of which is Singapore. Here the prime minister is elected, but there is
only one primary political party. The prime minister commands the armed forces
and there is long-term political stability. The fifth model is the most complicated
of all. Here the command and control system of national security consists of the
elected president and the parliamentary government. The president is the su-
preme commander-in-chief. Finland is the most successful example of this sys-
tem. It depends on both formal and informal links.
In many cases the post of the commander-in-chief is more of an honourable
nature and the person holding it does not possess any real administrative or op-
erational power. In democratic countries a commander-in-chief is always a civil-
ian. In Finland it is the president and in Israel it is the prime minister. If the
president is the supreme commander-in-chief, then the responsibilities of the prime
minister, military authorities and the military council must be clearly determined
by law.
In most countries the ministry of internal affairs exercises the police func-
tions in peacetime. It is also responsible for the frontier troops. But in the state of
emergency the general command  for the police and the frontier troops passes
over to the ministry of defence.
In most countries the ministry of defence is directly placed in the command
chain between the supreme commander-in-chief and the general staff. As a rule,
the reserves - be it in the national guards, territorial army or something else - are
subordinate to the same general command. This is very important. For political
reasons, in the Baltic States there has been a tendency to separate the National
Guards with their own command. I think this was an error. In the majority of
countries, the command, conscription, training and mobilisation of all personnel
are centralised and are not subordinated to military districts as was the practice in
the Soviet Union. In my opinion you should separate responsibilities and func-
tions according to peacetime on the one hand, and war time on the other, since no
combat situation can be planned in advance. I believe there is no sense either in
vesting someone with the power of commander-in-chief without developing rel-
evant instruments of responsibility and control. And responsibility first of all
implies fiscal control of the defence budget.
In my opinion, a small and poor country needs a small and united general
staff, which will be charged with the direction of combat operations. The civilian
ministry of defence should be entrusted with all other functions including the
supply and procurement. Defence offices shall be directly accountable to the
supreme commander-in-chief. The supreme commander-in-chief also needs an in-
dependent information network, which cannot be fettered by the bureaucratic
system.
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The supreme command shall monitor the fiscal procedure. I believe that both
the peacetime and wartime command chains should be identical. The defence
minister should stand between the supreme commander-in-chief and the general
staff.
When planning a system you should distinguish between the military-admin-
istrative and tactical-operational functions. For example, in many countries there
is a commander-in-chief of infantry, which is responsible for the organisation
and training of military units and the selection of equipment, but he does not
exercise any operational control over them.
I believe that the national security council should report to the supreme com-
mander-in-chief. The council should have at least three functions. It provides
advice on the issues of political, fiscal and trade-industrial activities. As to the
net assessments and intelligence functions - this is the responsibility of the su-
preme commander-in-chief.
I believe that in small countries the air-force and the navy shall be treated as
combat units like the infantry and artillery with but one difference in wartime
their headquarters are turned into tactical-operational centres. This is entirely
different from the US system. The number of commanders should not be large.
Georgia cannot afford to deploy a numerous professional cadre. Any officer,
working in a military school, should be able to serve as a combat commander in
wartime. It is possible to combine various posts. For instance, in the Israeli Air-
Force the personnel commander, who is a brigadier-general, is also a pilot of a F-
15 in wartime. The command structure shall reflect the primacy of land forces. In
a small country which is facing great danger, tactical control should be decentral-
ised in wartime.
Unidentified participant: I would like to add that a young democracy needs
a special contact and oversight through the parliamentary commission. Two com-
missions are needed: those of defence and the budget. If you consider the budget
you will maintain authority over the entire armed forces. All of the parliamentary
parties shall be represented in these commissions. This will make their decisions
more effective.
Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck: Georgia has had the Constitution for six
months now, which has already determined a number of issues in the field of
national security. Therefore, the area for alternatives is limited. I expect the Geor-
gian colleagues to consider the alternatives within the Georgian Constitution. A
balance of forces shall be divided between the Parliament and the President. All
of the other institutions shall depend on them. But I know that the parliamentary
control is weak here. I have a question: how is the Parliament to control the Presi-
dent with respect to national security issues? What do the Parliaments terms of
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reference cover: the taking of decisions on declaring war or peace, or the approval
of nominees to military posts? These instruments of control are not available in
Georgia yet. The third issue refers to the budget. A draft budget should be very
detailed. In this respect, the experience of the countries governed by Moscow
greatly differs from Western practice. The defence budget control was much looser
in the Soviet Union.
As to parliamentary control over the intelligence agencies, they still doubt in
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe whether to bring them under control
or not. But if societies do not disapprove of lack of control over intelligence
agencies, renaming them will not change anything. Parliamentary control should
extend to the activities of the security agencies as well. And first of all, this con-
trol should extend to those steps of the intelligence agency aimed at surveillance
of private citizens.
There is another important dimension of the reform which security services
in the former communist countries should undergo: intelligence work both within
the country and without should be conducted by two independent agencies.
Philip Wasielewski then made his presentation to the working group:
In most modern democracies, command and control of the Armed Forces are
shared between the executive and legislative branches. In a federal system, com-
mand and control responsibilities are strictly divided between a President and a
Congress. In a parliamentary system this division is less defined but, as a rule, the
Prime Minister, who is elected from the party which has won in the elections,
exercises the command and the control functions of the executive branch, while
the parliamentary majority has the responsibility for its legislative side. Gener-
ally, the main command and control responsibility rests with a Commander-in-
Chief. He appoints the Minister of Defence, senior civilian advisors, all the offic-
ers of the Armed Forces. He is responsible for approving military and security
strategy, for giving direction to the military. He also responsible for creating a
relevant budget. And finally, the Executive, as a rule, declares war or the state of
emergency and orders the use of military force.
The command and control responsibilities of the legislative branch are fi-
nancial and supervisory. The Parliament determines all military expenditures. It
also exercises oversight on how the money, allocated to defence, is spent. It in-
vestigates the matters of corruption in the armed forces. In many countries the
parliament is to approve all the appointments to military posts. The parliament
passes the laws and rules governing the Armed Forces, including those concern-
ing their internal discipline. Finally, the parliament is required to approve the act on
the declaration of war, adopted by the Executive. As a rule, the responsibilities of
both branches of power are detailed in the Constitution.
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Peacetime Chain of Command
Country X
Chart 1
                              Executive                             Legislative
       MOD staff                   M Ministry of Defence (MOD)          Individual Services
                          Army           Air Force
    Inspector      Intelligence              1st Brigade        1st Fighter Group
  General              2nd Brigade         2nd Fighter Group
                                          Airborne Brigade                1st Bomber Group
              Navy                        Air Defense (AD)
 MMilitary                Mobilization          Submarine Group           1st AD Bn
    Personnel         1st Destroyer Group  2nd AD Bn
       2nd Destroyer Group  3rd AD Bn
   Armament               Logistics
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The more concrete and day-to-day command and control responsibilities for
the Armed Forces are found in the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence
provides advice to the executive branch on a national military strategy. It submits
requests for funding the implementation of this strategy to the parliament. Then
it receives the strategy and funding from both branches and engages in their im-
plementation and utilisation. The Ministry of Defence supervises the different
services of the Armed Forces. It determines common procedures for recruitment,
pay, training, supply, communications, medical service, purchasing weapons,
maintenance of discipline, discharging personnel. It may itself control the pur-
chasing of fuel, food or military clothing.
The individual military services such as the army, navy, air force and air
defence forces perform those command and control functions that are directly
related to specific war fighting tasks. This is achieved through both administra-
tive and operational chains of command.
Command and control at the individual unit level is simplified with a chain-
of-command from senior to junior officers and then to the senior non-commis-
sioned officers to the individual soldiers.
This is an outline of command and control systems in most democracies.
Militaries are at peace the majority of their time, therefore, the above-discussed
structure is designed for peacetime. This structure, as a rule, is one way, vertical.
Decisions flow from the Executive and Legislative branches down to individual
soldiers.
The first chart, which I have here, represents the command structure for
peacetime. It is similar to what you have in Georgia today. Although this chart
does not reflect the reality of any specific country.
A different, more responsive and more flexible command and control struc-
ture is required for wartime. The main reasons why the peacetime command and
control structure cannot be used in wartime consist in following: the field com-
mand structure must be close to the battlefield and mobile. It must be able to
combine different weapons, the units of one branch as well as the units of differ-
ent services. This structure must have a fast pace of performance. However, it
must still maintain a vertical structure of command and ensure the primacy of the
civilian leadership. The civilian leadership must set the war aims and strategy
and then delegate the authority to the field commanders to carry out this strategy.
Field commanders need a different command and control structure. They cannot
work through their individual services and the ministry of defence.
In peacetime leading command authorities are in the capital, far from the fight-
ing. Besides, new demands are likely to arise in wartime which will not be met by
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Defence, must continue their normal functions. People must still be recruited and
trained. They must still be paid even when a war is going on.
Therefore, two separate but simultaneous command and control structures
are needed: one to fight the war and the other - to keep the military running. The
peacetime structure must be able to support the wartime structure.
Field commanders need separate staffs for planning their actions and com-
munications with both their subordinate units and the peacetime structures in the
capital. As it has already been noted, a special control mechanism is required in
wartime - be it the General Staff of the Field Command. Chart 2 represents a
wartime command and control structure. It is more like an American model, in
which operational forces are subordinate to different field commanders. Tactical
units from each of the separate services are allocated to the field commander. He
maintains direct operational control over them through the representation of those
services at his headquarters. His staff assists him in his relations with the peace-
time structures (the ministry of defence).
The manning of these wartime or peacetime structures is a great problem
even for large countries. In some countries the nucleus of the wartime command
and control structure is maintained manned even in the peacetime and then in
wartime they are replenished from the peacetime structures and the Reserves.
The most essential billets are manned with professionals. In wartime some peo-
ple assume new responsibilities in addition to their peacetime activities. In some
countries wartime personnel is reinforced by Reserve officers.
In any case, the wartime command and control structure must have two fea-
tures. First, it must be under civilian control and carry out the decisions of the
civilian leadership only. Second, it must be prepared for co-operation with civil-
ian decision makers. Whatever command system you use, be it the General Staff
or the Field Command, these two requirements remain valid.
In the end, let us discuss the crisis management and control structure. It
serves the cause of counter-terrorism. Because of the political nature of terror-
ism this structure must include the highest levels of the government. Its operating
procedures must be practiced ahead of time and in realistic exercises.
The National Crisis Management Team should include the President, Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of Justice, representatives
of the police and the Intelligence. This Team should have a small cadre of admin-
istrative and communications personnel. During a crisis this Crisis Management
Team will communicate with the on-the-scene Incident Management Standing
Team. The latter will directly handle the terrorist incident. The Incident Manage-
ment Team must have an overall commander who will control the local police, fire
and medical services, the national counterterrorism team and the national hostage
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Chart 3
National Crisis Management Team
Minister of
Foreign Affairs
    Minister of Defense                                                          Minister of International Affairs
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negotiation team. Chart 3 represents the mentioned structure.
The Incident Management Team should follow a standard set of command
and control procedures, which may be quite complex. Look at Chart 4.  All the
participating agencies must constantly be involved in them. Once a terrorist act
occurs there will be very little time to plan. 90 per cent of all preparations must be
done in advance.
Newly emerging democracies have many challenges, especially in direct-
ing the use of force by the government. Only if a permanent and established
command and control system is in place will the civilian government be able to
control the use of force. Otherwise, war and terrorism will control the govern-
ment.
David Tsintsadze spoke on behalf of the Georgian Ministry of Security.
The Ministry comprises functions of both intelligence and counter-intelli-
gence. We understand it is still far from the world standards that Mr. Wieck
described. Currently, following the Presidents instruction, the Ministry is en-
gaged in struggle against organised crime, although this kind of work is not
within its usual mandate. As for the civilian control it is exercised by the Presi-
dent and the Parliament. Besides, there is a Security Council, the Procurators
Office and the Court. In its operational activities our agency is guided by the
laws on human rights, for example, when listening in telephone conversation.
Currently in cooperation with the Security Council we are developing a na-
tional counterterrorism program, for which we take into consideration western
experience.
In the future we will return to the performance of intelligence functions in
full. The ministry will once again be transformed into an Information and Intel-
ligence Agency as it was in 1992-93. The present structure is most appropriate
for a country in democratic transition.
Chairman: How real is parliamentary control over the Ministry of Security?
Tsintsadze: The Parliamentary defence commission has considered a draft
law on State Security Service which was developed by the National Security
Council. This is unprecedented in the history of Georgia. Every provision is thor-
oughly examined in the Parliament and the Security Council. The only issues that
are inaccessible for the Parliament are those related to secret agents. In case of an
insistent request they can obtain some information, though very limited.
Ambassador Wieck: I do not quite understand the functions of your agency.
Are you dealing with internal affairs only or are you charged with foreign intelli-
gence as well? How do you co-operate with Army Intelligence? And with respect
to terrorism, do you collect the information or are you also charged with taking


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tsintsadze: There is no independent agency in charge of intelligence. We
have a Ministry of Security, which includes both intelligence and counter-intelli-
gence. I do not think it quite appropriate to discuss the directions of our intelli-
gence; as for counter-terrorism activities we are entrusted with this by law. It is
rather difficult to understand this, as our legal system is different. We have spe-
cial, quite strong and skilled sub-units to handle terrorism. They are inferior to
none within the CIS. As a matter of fact, the United States has largely contributed
to this.
As for the Army Intelligence, we receive information from them. We process
it and submit to the President.
Wieck: Who gives you sanctions to listen in private conversations?
Tsintsadze: The Procurator does. We have a special legislation which regu-
lates criminal investigation activities. If, in the process of listening in, it turns out
that the conversation has nothing to do with the matter of inquiry, the recording
ceases. We have never disclosed any private life details. This is set forth in the
law.
Under the same law the people who assist the security system are to be ren-
dered assistance in return. But the public consciousness is inadequate. People do
not understand that it is their civic duty to assist the Security Agency. Of course,
I do not mean reporting on a drunk neighbour.
Irakli Khartishvili: How efficient would it be to divide the Security Minis-
try into counter-intelligence and intelligence agencies?
Tsintsadze: This kind of division will not be proper at present. Here is Rus-
sias example: the division of these two spheres has brought about the disruption
of centralisation there.
Chairman: Is this because division is costly and therefore unwelcome, or is
it inconvenient in general?
Tsintsadze: Besides being costly it creates personnel problems. It is difficult
for a small country to set up and staff two agencies.
Wieck: If you continue to maintain the Soviet framework of the security
institutions, you will not gain peoples confidence. If you want their confidence
everything must be open. Besides, the security service should not have any puni-
tive functions. This is most essential. The Western European approach is not
very different from American one. Operational intelligence is the prerogative of
a military structures - the General Staff, though there is no General Staff in Ger-
many. Declaration of war is Parliaments concern.
Khartishvili: In the United States system, the Defence Department is charged
with administrative functions - training, procurement, and so on. The USA has
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rejected a General Staff; as for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it does not exercise any
command but provides recommendations for the President. This is one of the
ways of maintaining civilian control. However, this system is too costly; there-
fore, a General Staff is more preferable for us. What are the protective mecha-
nisms from the General Staff?
The second issue refers to the declaration of war. In the United States the
President is entitled to wage war for 60 days. In exceptional cases it can be pro-
longed for 30 more days. After that the Congress sanction is required. This is too
great a luxury for us, since ours is a small country. In Israel the right to declare
war is vested in the Defence Council and not the President. What is your opinion
in this connection?
Mr. Brower has stated that the emphasis should be made on infantry troops.
This is all very clear but how efficient will that be? We have a good example of
the Korean war when the North Korean tanks smashed the South Korean infantry
in three days. There can be no doubt in the efficiency of tanks, though currently
anti-tank equipment may be better.
Brower: Different countries have different approaches to the Defence Min-
istry and the General Staff. In some countries both of them are functioning,
with one department headed by a civilian leader and another - by a military
commander. In some countries the Chief-of-Staff and the General Director of
the Ministry report to the Defence Minister. It is impossible to make a sweep-
ing generalisation. In a country which gives priority to the civilian control these
structures are integrated. In some countries both of these structures share the
defence responsibility. In some countries the General Staff and the Defence
Ministry are separated. Both of these approaches to organization work.
As for the question which was asked concerning the role of tanks I will an-
swer with two one-word arguments. There arguments are: a) mountains, b) money.
Chairman: Dr. Revaz Adamia, the chairman of the Parliamentary De-
fence Commission has just joined us. His participation is doubly interesting.
According to what the representative of the Ministry of Security has said, the
Defence Commission exercises efficient control over the agency. And be-
sides, the commission is concerned with the development of defence legisla-
tion.
Dr. Revaz Adamia: We had a remarkable sandwich of civilian control yes-
terday. What I want to say is that we were holding our seminar on the first floor,
Mr. Grachev and Mr. Nadibaidze were negotiating on the second and another
seminar was held on the third floor. Thus, various control mechanisms are avail-
able. And now in all seriousness. To say that our commission controls law-en-
forcement structures would be grossly exaggerated, though we try to. Co-ordina-
47
tion with the executive branch has been improving lately; however, it does not
mean that we no longer have any impediments. As for legislation, we have enor-
mous work to do. We have to develop laws, do a lot of institutional work. The
Soviet legacy must be fundamentally changed. You were talking about intelli-
gence here. I share Ambassador Wiecks pathos; if we are building a democratic
country, Intelligence cannot be a unified structure. However, we should act sen-
sibly. We have our bitter experience: KGB was dissolved and separated in 1991,
but this entailed the paralysis of Security. A number of special services were set
up which did not co-operate with one another. Their re-unification was, among
others, dictated by the desire to improve control. This kind of control may not be
good or perfect, but it is still control. In our reality, everything depends on indi-
viduals rather than institutions. This is because the State institutions are still too
amorphous. The Soviet legacy also plays its part, people have been brought up in
an old manner. As for the division of Intelligence into Intelligence and Counter-
Intelligence we are already working on it at the Presidents instructions. Since
our Constitution is after the American model these structures are also likely to
follow the American pattern.
Referring to the command structure of the Defence Ministry and in the Armed
Forces, I would like to agree with my honourable colleague who expressed in two
words the limiting factors on the basis of which our military concept is to be
developed. Unfortunately, under the circumstances one of the factors is avail-
able and the other - is not. We have mountains but lack the money. But even
these two factors are not taken into account properly. Of course, lack of money
does not need much thinking, but the significance of mountains should be thor-
oughly considered. Meanwhile, we are building a typical Soviet army. I recall
an old joke: a combat operation was being planned in a Chinese General Staff.
The Commander-in-Chief was doing the planning and said that the first Army
of 30 million men was to be placed on the right flank, the second Army of 45
million was to take its position on the left flank, a 70-million third Army was to
be in the centre and they were to be followed by tanks. Someone asked him:
All the tanks at once? - No, the Commander-in-Chief said, first one tank,
then the other. We do not dispose of vast manpower resources like the Chi-
nese do, but the situation with out tank resources is quite similar to the one




PROBLEMS IN THE REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT; ETHNIC-
TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS AND
SECURITY REGIMES IN GEORGIA
Chairman - Revaz Gachechiladze
Ivliane Khaindrava began the discussion by singling out two basic aspects
of the national security problem: 1) The defence potential of the state and its
armed forces; 2) International guarantees of the State security, and pointing out
that the latter aspect is often considered more important in todays world, though,
the former should not be neglected..
International mechanisms are still inert, they need time to become active.
Meanwhile a country should manage to utilize the maximum of its capacities.
As for the first aspect, according to the Defence Law of Georgia (Article  2),
Georgia defends its independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty through-
out the country by means of its own Armed Forces. Georgia should not lag be-
hind any other country of equal territory and manpower resources in terms of its
Armed Forces. The Georgian Armed Forces must be able to stop the enemys
advancement at Georgias frontiers, as well as to beat off any missile, air and
artillery attack throughout the territory of Georgia. The Georgian Armed Forces
must be able to strike a retaliatory blow against any aggressor.
This quotation shows that a certain, though incomplete outline of Georgias
national security concept already exists. However, it is not concrete, and not only
because our military has failed in the past to accomplish this task. Article 1 of the
same law says that Georgia has undertaken to refrain from producing, stockpiling
and shipping nuclear and mass destruction weapons on its territory. In Item A of
Article 2, Georgias stand is defined as that of active neutrality. But can one
speak of a countrys neutrality when its President signs an agreement on the de-
ployment of the military bases of another country, which is not quite neutral, on
Georgias territory for 25 years. Especially since we do not possess any effective
mechanisms to control the different kinds of weapons on these bases, among
them weapons of mass destruction.
The Republican Party of Georgia, which I represent here, believes that Geor-
gias strategic objective consists in the development of relations with NATO and
49
finally the integration in this organization. But due to the current internal political
situation in Georgia and international circumstances, the declaration of active
neutrality may be the first and indispensable step in getting away from the Rus-
sian military-political space. This policy would also correspond to Mr. Zbigniew
Brzezinskis Security Belt concept. Unfortunately, the Georgian government did
not or could not implement this policy in spite of the Parliaments repeated resolu-
tions on the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Georgia. That is why our secu-
rity system is not resolved any better now than it was in 1992. Lets recall the
development of further events. In 1993, the Head of State made a unilateral deci-
sion to join the CIS. Then Russian military detachments were awarded a status of
peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia and finally an agreement on the deployment of
the Russian Federation military bases on the territory of Georgia for 25 years was
initialed at the Defence Ministers level. Later on, the Head of State signed this
agreement as well. So, the vector of activities of the Georgian government moved
towards the reintegration into Russian military-political space, which in our opin-
ion was detrimental to Georgias strategic interests. Every counter-argument is
repealed by the experience, which shows that it is futile to hope that Russia will
help solve problems which she had inspired in the first place. Such a policy can
only be called a policy of weakness or self-deceit.
How a so-called collective security will be carried out within CIS is evident
after the examples of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and even Russia
itself. And above all, there is no prospect for any improvement, because in gen-
eral and in every specific case, the area of contradiction between different inter-
ests is greater than that of their coincidence. The legitimization of military bases
in Georgia needs just one last step - the ratification of the agreement by the
Parliament. We hope that at least this step will not be made, because the outlines
of certain changes for the better seem to have appeared in Georgian foreign policy.
Of the four neighbours with whom Georgia shares borders, the coincidence
of our geopolitical interests is clear with two. The vector of economic interests of
Turkish and Azerbaijanian non-fundamentalist Islamic states is directed to the
West. One of the prospective geostrategic lines connecting the regions of the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans passes through Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and then
Central Asian countries. In the Caucasus, it is crossed by the Russia-Armenia-
Iran line, which is less prospective but, nonetheless, worth considering. It is clear
that it is Georgias position that determines which of these lines is going to be the
stronger at this stage. Our agreements regarding the oil pipeline make us believe
that the alliance with the West is going to become the priority in the Georgian
policy. I am confident that the foundation of international guarantees of Georgias
security will be laid as soon as the sum of multilateral interests in Georgia reaches
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critical mass.
Alexander Rondeli: I completely agree with you, but what about our being
within the Big Brothers terrible magnetic field?! All that you are saying is an
ideal. The reality is a little different and you are well aware of this.
Khaindrava: I do not suppose there was anything idealistic in what I said.
Yesterday our guests also noted that fear makes mountains out of molehills. The
events in Chechnya prove that we overrated the danger. Chechnya, the Baltics,
and Moldova have proved that quite a lot depends on ones inner disposition.
Perhaps we are mesmerized. I think we must have self-respect, we have to clearly
define what we want. At the very least, we should have another defence minister.
Rondeli: I am also mesmerized. Bismarck said that Russia always seemed
stronger or weaker than it really was. When we speak of David and a Goliath, we
should be David. A small country, which is not coherent internally, will dare
nothing - this is the trouble with us. It would be different if we were unified like
the Baltic nations.
Janri Kashia: You have talked about Azerbaijan-Georgian-Turkish and Rus-
sian-Iranian intercrossing axes. What are our prospects in this regard?
Khaindrava: In my opinion these two axes compete. We would benefit by
integrating in the West-East line. But if Georgia fails to make the right choice and
the Western position is not firm enough, we might find ourselves integrated in the
North-South line, which is neither in Georgias nor the Wests interests.
Irakli Melashvili: When speaking of idealism or pragmatism let us consider
how much realistic and pragmatic the policy of Georgias current leadership is.
After the turmoil that Georgia has experienced, in particular after the Abkhaz
conflict, Georgia has been pursuing a policy which might be described as that of
regaining the territory at the expense of ceding its sovereignty. How promising
and practically implementable is this policy ? Over the last three years, Georgian
leadership has been rejecting the one essential principle on which a public con-
sensus had almost been reached, which consisted in Georgias being free from
Russian military bases. Georgia was not to be a part of any military-political
block. The change of policy has not brought about the resolution of any of the
conflicts; during the activities of peace-keeping forces about 1,200 Georgian citi-
zens were killed within their control zone, and just a couple of days ago, peaceful
civilians were kidnapped from the Zugdidi Region. Yesterday, the Defence Min-
isters of Russia and Georgia had a meeting. What can that mean at a time when
none of the political decisions have been taken? I do not speak of the economic
situation which we currently have in Georgia with Turkey accounting for 53 per-
cent of Georgias foreign trade and Russia only 17-18 percent. The promise of our
authorities as to the economic prosperity to be gained through the integration
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with the North has proved to be fiction. We can really ask: where is realism and
where is idealism?
Charles Fairbanks: Allow me to give you a view of how this issue is seen
from the outside. As it was pointed out in Mr. Khaindravas quite intelligent
observations, Russian power might be reduced to a minimum by joint efforts of
the Transcaucasian states. It strikes me as an American observer that there is a lot
of discussion of Russia and the Western countries at this conference and very
little attention is paid to the Caucasian states. I do not find it altogether correct,
since the Caucasian states are quite important to Georgias security. I do not
believe that any Western state will ever have as big military power in Transcaucasia
that Nagorny-Karabakh now has. On the other hand I do not believe that the
military power that Russia has now is as great as that of Armenia which is south
of the Greater Caucasus Chain. Over the last three years I have heard from many
Georgians that Georgia cannot exist independent from Russia because Russia is
so powerful and this makes me uneasy. There is some abstract truth in this but
not concrete truth. I think that the Georgians have an abstract feeling of a danger
coming from Russia and this feeling might turn into a real danger.
Russian policy and Russian power are very complex. There are some people
in the Russian elite who want to restore the Soviet Union. Some are simply specu-
lating in this issue for political advantage; there is also a third group which uses
the issue of Russias integration and the issue of Russians abroad as a cover for
their criminal activities. If we do not make these kinds of distinctions and if we
are not able to distinguish between the attitude of the Russian political elite to
this issue and the attitude of the Russian public, we will not be able to understand
the Russian motives and deal with them effectively. In short, more attention should
be paid to regional powers, the Transcaucasian countries and Chechnya, and less
to Western countries and Russia. It seems to me that the links among non-Rus-
sian republics have broken since 1991 and have been replaced by the orientation
towards Washington, Bonn and London. And yet many Georgians have strong
personal friendship with important figures of other republics, which can be used
for the revival of intra-Caucasian contacts.
Niko Vashakidze: We had no option whatsoever at the time when Georgia
joined the CIS, since after the defeat in the Abkhaz war there arose a real danger
of the aggression to be spread deep into the country. It could have happened just
in a couple of days.
David Darchiashvili: It is a common truth that a security structure consti-
tutes a certain mixture of domestic and foreign factors. It has repeatedly been
emphasized within the Georgian political elite, that the foreign factor and in par-
ticular the relationship with Russia is of vital importance if only for the countrys
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internal stabilization. Georgian political consciousness emanates from the fact that
it is Russia which poses a major danger, and the security system implies the devel-
opment of steps against this imaginary or real danger. Consequently, Georgias
political choice was determined relative to this danger. At times, it became the
Georgian policy to try escaping this danger by opening the door to it or appeasing
it, but at times the ways of neutralizing Russias influence were also sought. We
can recall the joining of the CIS, steps towards the formation of Georgian-Russian
army, attempts to regain Abkhazia by means of Russian bayonets. At the same
time certain attempts were made to search for alternative guarantees. The Georgian
political elite still remains at the crossroads and cannot yet decide on the way of
facing what it deems to constitute the major danger. This is one of the reasons for
the absence of Georgias security concept to this day.
Kashia: Mr. Fairbanks has reviewed the situation in the Caucasus. In my
opinion we cannot evade the Russian problem because the problem of the Cauca-
sus is a Russian problem in general. It is clear today that the Chechen problem is
not just a Caucasian problem but a Russian problem as well. It would have been
very easy to resolve all the problems in the Caucasus without a Russian factor. In
real politics, however, Russia has its own interests in the Caucasus. As to inter-
Caucasian interests, they do not coincide with those of Russia. That is why we
are discussing Russia and not the problems of our Caucasian neighbours. Theo-
retically the situation can be discussed without Russia, but not in terms of a real
situation and not in terms of the Caucasian security. The danger comes from the
North as well as from the Western attitude towards Russia and the Caucasus.
Fairbanks: The Chechen problem is a Caucasian problem as much as it is a
Russian problem. Certain forces in Russia vested Dudaevs regime with power in
order to take Abkhazia from Georgia. But this was done without paying any re-
gard to the considerations and needs of Russias integrity. Therefore, Chechnya
and Abkhazia are interrelated. I also believe that the beginning of the war in
Chechnya was directly connected with the signing of the Azerbaijan oil consor-
tium agreement, and it is mainly aimed at resolving the problem of the Northern
oil pipeline route. I think my argument has been misinterpreted. I certainly agree
that Russia is the biggest potential security problem. But I also know other prob-
lems of a similar degree and significance for other Transcaucasian states. Rus-
sian forces in Georgia will be able to operate effectively only through Ossetian
and Abkhazian separatism. I want to make a fundamental distinction between
security problems and the solution of these particular problems. Russia is the
biggest security problem - and a very complicated one - but I think that other
Transcaucasian and Caucasian powers are no less important part of the solution
of problems.
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Melashvili: I would like to agree with Mr. Fairbanks that it is very complicated
to consider Georgias security without discussing the Caucasian problems. The
Georgians did pay considerable attention to this issue. However, as a result of our
errors at the beginning of the 1990s, Russia managed to direct those forces in the
Caucasus who were guided by national sentiment against Georgia instead of her-
self, thus creating great danger for us. It is common knowledge that Bassaevs
units were trained by the Russian military not far from Gudauta.
On the other hand the Chechen problem is directly connected with the oil
pipeline. Just at the beginning of the conflict, the Georgian Parliament came across
a document according to which Georgias oil refineries and gas pipelines were to
be privatized and the Russian Gasprom was to become the holder of the con-
trol package of shares. Russia tried to do away with the Chechen issue through
waging a war against Dudaev, thus making it easier for a decision on the oil
pipeline route to be made which would best suit Russian interests and at the same
time deprive Georgia of a similar chance. We do give priority to the settlements
of relations with our North Caucasian neighbours. Without this it will be very
difficult to solve Georgias security problems, because Russia will always have a
chance to promote the syndrome of permanent tension in Georgia - in which she
will appear to be a supreme arbitrator instead of an interested party. In 1921,
Lloyd George stated that they would rather tolerate Russian dominance in the
Caucasus than accept a permanent unrest in the region. We have fallen prey to
our inability to solve the Caucasian problems, as well as to certain peoples pref-
erence to see the Caucasus peaceful rather than another hotbed of unrest.
Alexandr Boicharov: Having met with both Georgian, South Ossetian, and
Abkhaz leaders, including Ardzinba himself, I have the impression that all of the
parties want to resolve the existing dilemmas. At the same time, arguments which
they use when talking to one another resemble those used in family feuds. In my
opinion, this does not signify the inexperience of these leaders. It has its roots in
your history. This concerns all the other CIS countries. I do not know how old
your Defence Ministry is - two, three years old? What could we expect from a
three-year-old ministry? It is like a three-year-old child, it cannot walk properly.
The same applies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has never dealt with any
security problems; everything was decided by Moscow. It is not that these people
do not want to discuss the Abkhazian and Ossetian problems in geopolitical or
scientific terms, but because they have never had any experience of doing so.
The initiative of the Georgian government on Peaceful Caucasus indicates
that the country is getting away from this kind of communal approach. It has
presented Georgian problems in a broader context. The country is trying to in-
volve not only its neighbours but also international organizations in order to
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create guarantees for safeguarding peace in the Caucasus Region. Quite recently,
a Georgian delegation made a presentation at the Governing Council of OSCE in
Prague. A decision is being taken now on considering the Peaceful Caucasus
initiative as part of a regional aspect of the model of European security for the
21st century which is to be discussed at the summit meeting of the Heads of
European States in Lisbon this December.
The Peaceful Caucasus initiative could be one of the strategies for the na-
tional security concept of Georgia, but it should be formulated not just as a set of
ideas but as a contingency plan which will be comprehensible for strategic and
military analysts. If this plan is approved by your neighbours this will be the best
contribution to your national security concept.
Chairman: You have had an opportunity to get to know ethnic problems in
Georgia. I wonder if the Georgian-Ossetian conflict could have been avoided
without the interference of any third party?
Boicharov: It is a rather difficult question. I am no expert of the origin of
these conflicts. We see these conflicts the way they are at present.
Chairman: Can they be settled by Georgia itself?
Boicharov: No, they cannot.
Khaindrava: I agree with all those who put the stress on the co-operation in
the South Caucasus and the Caucasus in general. I have an impression that after
the Balkan problem is settled Western interest will logically move towards the
Caucasus if only for the same oil pipeline. It must be said that Russia is also
making arrangements: the agreement on deeper integration of Belarus-Russia-
Kazakhstan-Kyrghizstan is nothing else but an attempt to shift this West-East
continental line to the North. Later on, Russia will either open this line or close it,
or, which is more dangerous, will first open and then close it. This must be taken
into account.
I cannot help responding to Mr. Vashakidzes remark, that there was no alter-
native to Georgias joining the CIS. Of course what happened in Abkhazia was a
clear-cut aggression, but I wonder, who was going to take Tbilisi - the Abkhaz
fighters? It is obvious that the conflict that was under way at the time of joining
the CIS was among Georgians, and that it was a matter of seizing power, not of
occupying Tbilisi. It seems to me that one of the major shortcomings of the Geor-
gian authorities mentality consists of placing Russias interests in Georgia as
well as in the South Caucasus in the spotlight and then trying to bring Georgias
interests in line with them. Naturally, Russias interests should also be consid-
ered but it is Georgian interests that should matter in Georgia above all. We should
try to balance the interests of Russia, Turkey, London, Bonn or any other country
in accordance with these interests. Unless the Georgian authorities change their
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approaches this way, there will be no sense speaking of any coherent policy. I
understand that both the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are
young, but that is no excuse for not having developed a program of action.
Mamuka Kudava: The restoration of our territorial integrity is the principal
problem among our other security problems. We have tried to achieve this through
neutrality, co-operation with international organizations, signing agreements with
various countries, but all proved an illusion. The history of Georgia has demon-
strated that we are unable to defend ourselves on our own. A military force is
needed but our security policy should not be confined to army-building only.
It is necessary to: a) work out a regional policy and develop contacts and
institutional cooperation not only within the South Caucasus but in the entire
Caucasus; b) balance Russias policy with Western and other countries policies,
or, to be more precise, not just balance Russias policy but those of Russia and
the West together. In my opinion these are two main ideas of Georgias national
security concept.
I will try to substantiate what I have said. The Caucasus lacks a security
architecture at present. The cornerstone of our security policy lies in our realiza-
tion of being an integral part of the Caucasus. The more weighty we become on
the regional scale, the more attention the world will pay to us. The Peaceful
Caucasus initiative is going to play an important part in the security of the region.
The West has been paying more attention to the southern flank of Europe
lately - not only to avoid the danger of fundamentalism but also to control natural
resources. This is the Western model of security. A new term pivotal state has
appeared in US foreign policy. There is a tendency of growing attention to us on
the part of the United States. This tendency will result in NATO and the United
States becoming the guarantors of our security. Georgia can be a leader and a
pivotal state in this region.
Another cornerstone of our security consists in democratic reforms and eco-
nomic prosperity. World trade routes may pass via Georgia. This proves once
again how badly we need regional co-operation.
Neo-imperialism poses the greatest danger to Georgias security. That is why
we have to balance Russias impact. The struggle for the Caspian oil has intensi-
fied since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Georgia has a chance of becom-
ing a transit country. This is the reason for the growing desire of various coun-
tries to gain an influence here. Turkey is ready to fund the Georgian section of the
oil pipeline. At the same time Russia is striving to maintain its authority in any
decision-making on this issue.
Georgia has signed the CIS Collective Security Agreement. However, the con-
tradiction of interests of the CIS member-countries renders this agreement value-
56
less. On the other hand, if undemocratic processes continue in Russia this collec-
tive system might be activated against the West. This will revive the Cold War.
Therefore, Georgias balanced policy is correct and coincides with Western ap-
proach.
Another component of Georgias security policy is the acceptance of the
Ukraines initiative on the Development of Confidence and Security within the
Black Sea region. In the future this initiative might become instrumental in the
Black and Baltic Seas interregional cooperation. The cooperation of the Baltic
countries is under way and these two regional initiatives will be able to neutralize
Russias negative impact.
Next comes the cooperation within the framework of NATOs Partnership
for Peace initiative. It can be considered a certain form of NATO enlargement.
This initiative supports the development of the armed forces of its participants. It
might be helpful in our obtaining independence from Russias military assist-
ance. Partnership for Peace shall also be considered a balancing factor in our
security policy. None of the steps taken by Georgia shall be directed against the
West. In the future we must try join NATO and the European Community. That
will be a major guarantee of our future security.
And finally, our security is not only our problem. It might cause a challenge
to all.
Edward Rogers: It seems to me that out of the eight countries that I have
dealt with in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Georgia has made the greatest progress
towards true democracy. But there is certain danger in it too, because democracy
encourages open debate on every issue. And debates in Georgia often cause an
undesirable type of pluralism. It is my personal opinion that those among the
countries of the former Soviet Union that were faster in shaping a national vision
were more successful. They held the debates but came to a national consensus in
forming a national vision of their countries, or a myth which Mr. Kerr spoke of
yesterday. In some of the CIS countries, formation of a national visions is still
under way. These visions comprise political, economic and military elements
into a single whole. I think that the countries which are guided by this kind of
vision will be most successful in obtaining what they desire. There are many
paths that Georgia could follow; but you must choose the one direction you are
going to follow and do it quickly.
David Sikharulidze: The agreement on Russian military bases contains a
number of negative points. Russian bases are located in complicated regions in
terms of ethnicity and Russia controls the developments there through its mili-
tary forces, while the Vaziani base provides Russia with a good chance to stir up
trouble in Tbilisi. This was the case during the 1991-92 war in Tbilisi, and this was
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the case in connection with the August 1995 terrorist act. Besides, Russian troops
in Georgia outnumber the Georgian Army itself - thus limiting our sovereignty. By
the revision of quotas of conventional weapons allocated to Georgia, Russia re-
duces Georgias due share of equipment and weakens our defence potential. It is
also worthy of note that with Russias military bases on its territory, Georgia might
get involved in the joint security system which tomorrow may become the cause of
confrontation with the countries of the Atlantic region. Russias predominance is
quite obvious in the CIS security system. This system is serving Russias interests
and that makes it different from the NATO security system. That is why all the
peace-keeping forces found in Georgia consist of Russians only. We have wit-
nessed their inefficiency in practice. Besides, it is obvious that Russia views the
peace-keeping forces as a mechanism for defending its own interests.
Chairman: We keep talking of Russias interests and forget that other coun-
tries also have their interests in Georgia, that other countries also interfere in our
affairs.
Rondeli: The state is central to the concept of security. In the post-Soviet
space, the problem of statehood is of primary importance. All of the post-Soviet
states, with the exception of Russia, are essentially quasi-states. State-building is
primarily a domestic affair and international organizations can only assist in this.
A state has first to develop its own concept of national interest, the objectives
and priorities of the national security policy. This task is quite difficult for small,
weak powers. In the case of a newly emerged quasi-state, national security often
means the defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Security for a small
country simply means survival. The national security of small powers is essen-
tially of regional dimension, but they are mainly concerned about their internal
security. It is the internal insecurity that constitutes the main source of weakness.
Unstable state institutions encourage internal turmoil and interference of exter-
nal forces.
An internal weakness may stem from multi-ethnicity, regionalism, insuffi-
cient social and political cohesion of its population. In the case of the former
Soviet Union these weaknesses create particular danger to the very existence of
the states which have emerged on its territory.
Fortunately, the modern international system does not allow these quasi-states
disappear completely. They cannot be deprived of their sovereignty as a result of
war. At the same time we still live under the conditions in which the behaviour of
the states is determined by their national interests and power factor. The experi-
ence of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union has proved that small countries
should not rely on international norms only. They should seek their own security
within the framework of alliances and collective security. All of the three South
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Caucasian republics differ as to their geographic, demographic, cultural, political
and economic conditions. Consequently, their security interests are also differ-
ent. However, being weak quasi-states they have much in common. All three
must identify the sources of their internal and external weaknesses and national
security priorities. They are facing the task of developing security institutions.
The four years of independence did not suffice for the accomplishment of these
tasks.
Who is to identify the security interests and the tasks of the Transcaucasian
republics? In developed states, this is the responsibility of the ruling elite, which
is represented in the government, parliament, political parties. Public opinion
also contributes to this process. The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought a
great number of inexperienced and incompetent people to power, which resulted
in aggravation of already existing problems, especially in the area of inter-ethnic
relations. Under the cover of populism and nationalist slogans, irresponsible elites
triggered (not without external assistance) bloody conflicts.
The Transcaucasus is of a special challenge to the regional power triangle of
powers comprised of Russia, Turkey and Iran. Their rivalry is further intensified
by their long-standing opposition. Russia considers the Transcaucasus its near
abroad and tries to establish its own sphere of influence here. Using the divide
and rule policy, it is aggravating the disputes among Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Russia fears the formation of any regional alliance without its par-
ticipation. It also fears the possibility of the creation of buffer states and a secu-
rity vacuum in the Transcaucasus which might be filled by some other great power.
Russias ruling elite views the Transcaucasus as a sphere of its own vital inter-
ests.
Transcaucasian republics operate in Russias magnetic field. Armenia is
openly allied with Russia, and is making use of Russian forces against Azerbaijan.
The two other Transcaucasian republics which perceived their interests as delim-
ited from Russia have, as a result, put themselves on the brink of territorial disin-
tegration.
The security problems of these weak states of the Transcaucasus can be di-
vided into four components: 1) military-political; 2) economic; 3) ethnocultural;
4) ecological. These trigger intrastate and interstate conflicts, which may spill
beyond the boundaries of the region.
The ethno-cultural component of security seems to be the most important
for the Transcaucasus. A number of conflicts have stemmed from the ethno-
cultural mosaic of the region. These problems spark military-political confronta-
tion. The economic component is also essential. None of the Transcaucasian
states is economically independent. Each of them is undergoing an economic
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crisis. The Caspian oil transportation issue is also contributing to regional ten-
sions.
The security problems of the Transcaucasus are of a regional nature. We
cannot consider the entire Caucasus a unified security complex at the present
stage, since a part of the region constitutes Russias integral part. On the other
hand, the consideration of only Transcaucasian security complex might be an
oversimplification of the matter; a rudimentary structure cannot be called a com-
plex. For the time being, the security perspectives of these three Transcaucasian
states are mainly domestically directed. There is not enough security interaction
among them.
Powerful neighbours greatly influence the dynamics of Transcaucasian se-
curity. With the growth of the importance of Caspian oil, the role of the powerful
neighbours in shaping regional security might increase. Each of them has its own
interests. One of them - Russia - has managed, to a certain extent, to subordinate
regional security concerns to its own orientation. It has managed to reinforce its
influence through stationing its armed forces in the region. Thus, an external
power is playing a much greater role in the regional security dynamics, than the
countries of the region itself.
Russias efforts to create a collective security framework within the CIS and
to form a military alliance, if successful, can postpone the formation of the
Transcaucasian regional security complex for an uncertain period. On the other
hand, the rudimentary Transcaucasian security complex may be transformed into
a Caucasian complex if independent states emerge in the North Caucasus.
Melashvili: The best thing to be done for the settlement of conflicts is to
subordinate the peace-keeping forces to the United Nations.
Kakha Chitaia: National security must be based on democratic principles.
The reliance solely on a military forces without a thorough security system will
make things worse. The priority here should consist of developing of a regional
security system with the closest neighbours. The Parliament can play a very spe-
cial role in this. We have already begun making use of our contacts though we
have faced many obstacles on the way. The oil pipeline is one of the bases for the
extension of this co-operation. We have to get our neighbours interested. Our
neighbours security provides for our security. It would be most interesting to
hold a similar seminar on a regional scale in the future with the participation of
Russia, Turkey and Iran.
Kudava: It can be logically concluded from NATOs involvement in Bosnian
affairs that the West would pay greater attention to the Caucasus, and this is just
what is happening. I have already mentioned that the West cannot very actively
interfere in Caucasian affairs. Besides, the West cannot ignore the Russian neo-
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imperialism, because regional conflicts might well have their impact outside the
region. Therefore, the only thing to be done is that the West pay more attention to
Russias activities in the Caucasus and within the entire CIS.
Friedrich Kriesel: Democracy provides individual freedom for people and
conditions for economic well-being. You need foreign investors to achieve eco-
nomic well-being. But no foreign investor will take chances and invest his capital
unless stable conditions are created. You must put an end to confrontation with
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by all means with the exception of use of force. You
must stop discussing who started the war and who is entitled to what rights. None
of this will contribute to the improvement of the existing situation. You should
channel all your efforts towards reaching a certain level of your economy, stabi-
lizing the situation and making Georgia attractive to both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. I assure you, and this is my last statement, that you will have to do all
this by yourselves. Neither the West nor the East will help you in this. It is to be
accomplished by you and the population of Georgia.
After the working  groups concluded, a brainstorming session was held at
which the participants, divided in small groups, put forward their ideas on ways
to develop Georgias national security concept. Later on, the participants gath-
ered at a plenary session to hear the results of working groups activities and the
brainstorming.
THE BRAINSTORMING SUMMARY AND
CLOSING OF THE PLENARY SESSION
Chairman - Wolfgang Manig
The Chairman invited the rapporteurs from brainstorming groups to give a
short summary of its results:
Ghia Nodia: As a result of our discussion, we created a list of major problem
areas of Georgias security. At the same time we agreed that internal problems
are far more important to Georgias security than the external ones. In our opin-
ion major problem areas are the following:
 The social-human factor - Being a multi-ethnic country Georgia lacks the
sense of citizenship; national identity and the sense of civil society are not fully
developed. The development of the sense of citizenship is the only way to create
a Georgian unity.
 Lack of public discussions of security issues - It implies the necessity of
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security issues to be discussed by special government bodies, non-governmental
organizations and independent mass-media. The majority of the population con-
siders that the responsibility for providing security rests with the state and do not
care how and in what way it will be provided.
 Social-psychological area - Following the military defeats and internal
turmoil of the last years the greater part of the general public has lost its national
confidence. It has become a popular notion with us that Georgia is unable to
ensure its own security and has to entirely rely on an external force. Some view this
force in Russia, for others help should come from NATO. Confidence building,
whatever it might mean, is the most critical task for Georgia.
 The style of governance - There exists no coherent and publicly declared
policy concept. We still have the kind of leadership which considers that political
doctrines should better be kept secret. This means that not only the public but
also the government should be kept in ignorance as to the unified concept of the
state policy. As a result, every minister may pursue his or her own policy. The same
applies to the security area as well.
 Building state institutions - This group of problems comprises the ne-
cessity to fill in the gaps in the still incomplete constitution, army-building and the
establishment of a clear system of responsibilities, which will strictly define what
is required from every institution. Under the present system everyone is responsi-
ble for everything, while no one knows exact area of his or her responsibility.
These are major problems. However, there are issues of less importance but,
nevertheless, worthy of attention. One of them is the lack of a proper public
relations policy. No coherent efforts are made to improve Georgias image. This
does not involve only the West; Georgias image needs improving in the neigh-
bouring regions as well, for instance in the south of Russia. Insufficiency of com-
petent military, economic or legislative personnel in spite of a relatively high
educational level of Georgias population is another challenge. There is no clearly
defined governmental policy to improve the situation.
Kenneth Brower: The discussion started by defining the basis of national
security and the elements of the security mechanism. We have identified seven
elements: defining the threat; joining international organizations; creating a legal
framework; assessing the countrys military and political capabilities; conduct-
ing public education; developing the planning system and mechanisms of its con-
trol; upgrading the countrys military and scientific capacities.
Then we singled out two key issues - provision of the legal framework for the
national security and educational programs in the domain of national defence. The
parliament should require the Ministry of Defence to provide the assessment of an
external threat and its own military capabilities, to develop the concept of the
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Armed Forces, short and long-term financial planning. It is necessary to hold
national debates on national security issues and come to a consensus, because
the national security concept must be stable and must not change along with the
changes of governments or policies.
Georgia should follow in other countries footsteps and consider developing
a small elite high quality force that would be designed for peace-keeping opera-
tions. That would bring in tactics, concepts and qualification from foreign coun-
tries. It was also suggested that NGOs could also be used for the development of
the security system.
Irakli Mchedlishvili: We have addressed the following issues:
1) The essence of a security concept; who should develop it and what proce-
dures should be used when developing it.
2) Georgias international and domestic strategies; the role and the future of
the Russian Army in Georgia.
As a result of our discussions we have concluded that the national security
concept should be developed by the state institutions, including all the sections
of the executive branch, as well as independent organizations and individuals.
The Security Council, headed by the President, might perform the functions of a
coordinating body which will gather various suggestions and ideas and put the
document into final shape. Then the produced document has to be assessed. This
is once again to be done by various power structures but the Parliament and its
commissions shall take the lead. Later on the document should be finally exam-
ined by the Security Council and the Presidents advisors and signed by the Presi-
dent. The question whether the parliament should approve the document after
the President has signed it or just take it into consideration was extensively dis-
cussed. In the end, the majority of the group agreed upon the latter. The develop-
ment of the concept will take from 6 to 12 months, and it is to be calculated for a
five-year period, because five years are required for building stable armed forces.
The sovereignty of Georgia is the major principle that should serve as the basis of
this document. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the factors and forces which
may threaten the sovereignty and develop the ways of neutralizing these threats.
We differed on the principle of building Georgian armed forces, whether it
should be territorial or centralized. The priority of the territorial principle lies in
its inexpensiveness which for Georgia, as a weak country, is greatly important.
The supporters of the centralized principle emphasized that some regions of Geor-
gia are compactly populated by ethnic minorities which are under Russias influ-
ence. Their provision with armament and territorial unification might jeopardize
Georgias stability. We have discussed a kind of territorial system which would
exclude this threat. We cannot delimit ethnic groups from one another when speak-
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ing of a countrys unity. Everyone should serve in the army together and the
territorial principle does not at all imply the creation of ethnic armies.
As for the presence of the Russian Army in Georgia the results of our discus-
sion can be summed up as follows: it is acceptable at the current stage of our
development, but in the future they should withdraw from Georgia.
Edward Rogers: First I would like to thank Mr. Glitza for proposing a sys-
tematic approach to this problem. We have agreed that the present national secu-
rity policy of Georgia should be of a transitional nature and should not cover a
long time frame. Thus we have selected a two-year period. The systematic ap-
proach involves five steps. The first step was to identify the interests of Georgia.
We have identified twenty interests. Then we attempted to divide them into cat-
egories. The first category comprised wider interests, or the interests for which
Georgia would go to war. The second category was very important interests, the
next was important and the last category was simply interests.
We have come up with three wide interests. They are: preservation of inde-
pendence and sovereignty of Georgia, the national defence of Georgia, and the
regaining of lost territories. Then we moved to the third stage and attempted to
define what was required to achieve these particular wider interests. Our primary
concern was the first interest - that of the preservation of sovereignty and inde-
pendence. The presence of foreign military bases was considered to be the pri-
mary threat to the sovereignty. The second threat was thought to be lack of na-
tional consensus and self-consciousness.
We did not discuss the issue of national defence in detail because it is com-
mon knowledge that a countrys borders must be defended. Therefore, we quickly
moved to the third wide interest - the regaining of lost territories. It was noted
that this process might stretch beyond a two-year period. We agreed that the
reorganization and reinforcement of the army should be conducted in parallel
with peaceful negotiations.
The essential conclusion is that national security strategy can be developed
provided that a systematic approach is undertaken by the government or NGOs.
David Losaberidze: Our discussion mainly covered two aspects: definition
of general problems and the outlines of concrete steps to be made. As to the
general problems, we singled out foreign and domestic factors. We considered
the development of Eurasian corridor through which Georgia will become a junc-
tion between Central Asia, which is rich in natural resources, and highly ad-
vanced Europe, our priority in foreign policy. The development of a coherent
collective security system in the Caucasus shall be the second priority.
The West will not pay sufficient attention to Georgia unless attempts are
made to develop a unified stability system in the Caucasus. However, it was also
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pointed out that currently, with intense opposition among the peoples of the
Caucasus which is based not only on ethnic but also on geo-political and strategic
interests, no rapid solution of this issue is realistically possible. All that should be
done now is to reinforce Georgias state institutions and achieve the greatest
stabilization of the state system. It is the factor that a stable Georgia that must
become the unifying force for the entire Caucasus. The unity of the Caucasus
must be an ideal and not tomorrows short-term plan.
Of domestic factors, the attention was concentrated on the problem of es-
trangement between the authorities and the population. A certain part of our popu-
lation maintains a hostile attitude to the authorities for political reasons while
another greater part has entirely lost any interest in the state policy due to eco-
nomic hardships. Therefore, reforms must be accelerated to overcome this prob-
lem. The interests of the development of powerful state structures might come
into collision with economic reforms. In that case the development of economy
should come first. In the future, an advanced economy will be instrumental in
setting up powerful state institutions. At present these institutions must be as
flexible and inexpensive as possible. We also considered the sentiments of disap-
pointment and loss of self-confidence which is widely spread in Georgian politi-
cal circles. The political will of the state, the nation and its leadership is a greatly
important factor which can be critical in the solution of a number of problems.
With respect to the prospects of western assistance, it was stated that it could
not be a purely military assistance, though the West could greatly contribute to
setting up Georgian state institutions and training highly qualified personnel. This
applies to the building of a military as well.
When discussing specific issues of building a military, the supporters of the
principles of volunteering and conscription came to an agreement that a small
elite unit of the army should be formed on the basis of volunteering principle
which would act as a Rapid Reaction Corps, while the problem of the numerous-
ness of the army should be solved through conscription. The terms of service
should be reduced and the army should be formed on the basis of a territorial
principle but in such a way as to avoid ethnic-regional divisions.
The intelligence services need profound reforms. The objective of the mili-
tary intelligence should be to study the military situation of neighbouring states.
Counter-intelligence should primarily deal with ethnic conflicts which are quite
often directed from outside. Counter-intelligence shall not only be engaged in
gathering information, and should by no means be considered a law-enforcement
agency, since this would most certainly engender peoples resentment.
David Darchiashvili: Discussions in our group referred for the most part to
the legal status of the security concept, outlining two distinctly opposing stands.
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The majority of the participants considered that the national security concept
should be a political declaration to be adopted after broad discussions with the
participation of the countrys political parties and respective state institutions, as
well as the broad public. This will be a manifestation of a general political will
which should not be violated. However, this kind of violation does not entail any
punishment since such a concept cannot have the force of a law. Some Georgian
participants had their doubts as to whether this kind of document could carry any
weight in Georgia, where respect for the law is very low. The Constitution and
our laws are often violated, more than in countries with considerable experience
in democracy. Therefore, they considered it preferable to adopt the constituent
parts of the national security concept as a package of laws.
This divergence of opinions led the discussion to a general issue as to what
kind of state we were building. Some expressed their doubts that in spite of a
general pro-western orientation, a part of our political elite was unconsciously
guided by the model of a totalitarian state and therefore, we had to primarily
define what kind of state Georgia wanted to be. We arrived at a conclusion that if
we were speaking of a stable, far-reaching strategy, a civil, open society was a
better guarantor of our national security. Citizens can be more easily rallied in a
society where citizens enjoy greater liberties.
In the second half of the discussion we identified the factors which would be
instrumental in upgrading the efficiency of the national security system. These
factors are: developing political and military education, creating a real and effec-
tive budget, re-structuring the intelligence agency, namely, separating the infor-
mation service from law-enforcement levers, pursuing a more principled foreign
policy and providing institutions responsible for the security policy, with fuller
information.
Nino Nanava: Our group agreed upon the initial principle that the national
security concept should be based on the interests of an individual. This is the
feature which distinguishes the national security concept in democratic countries
from that of the former Soviet empire, which used to subordinate everything to
state interests. National mentality and traditions should also be taken into ac-
count. It is critical to establish the principles of tolerance and equality between
ethnic and confessional groups of the society, which should be achieved through
education.
As for the principle of building a military in Georgia, under present condi-
tions it is the conscription system that should have the priority and not the crea-
tion of a professional army. Economic progress and the establishment of demo-
cratic institutions are of paramount importance for the development of the secu-
rity system. Georgia is not lacking in specialists who will be able to develop the
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security concept. They need intellectual rather than financial assistance.
Chairman noted that the brainstorming had resulted not only in the identifi-
cation of problems related to the development of the national security concept, as
it was initially the objective, but also the foundation was laid to the search of
answers to raised problems, to the very development of the national security
concept.
After a short break, Chairman Manig summed up the results of the seminar.
According to Georgian participants, three basic problems are to be addressed
for the formulation of the national security concept. The first, as it has been
mentioned on several occasions, is lack of transparency of government actions
and plans, which entails a disregard of civilian, namely parliamentarian control
on the part of law-enforcement structures. The second problem is lack of loy-
alty. The building of the state is not fully accomplished and loyalty is very
important for the development of civic consciousness. Lack of loyalty is clearly
visible in young peoples avoidance of the draft and their unwillingness to
serve in the army. The third problem is the reluctance on behalf of the govern-
ment to accept public engagement in forming the security policy. Quite often,
the wrong people are found in high positions which indicates lack of control
mechanisms.
Besides these three major problems, the brainstorming session has resulted
in the outlining of three major ideas:
 Strengthening of civic consciousness - This will diminish ethnic separatism
and develop the sense of loyalty. This is not only the loyalty of the military but
also the loyalty of civil servants.
Loyalty to the State - Public servants remain in their offices despite eco-
nomic hardships.
Regional co-operation - Georgian sovereignty and independence will be
strengthened by the co-operation with other countries of the region. And all of
this will finally become a precondition to the establishment of civilian control.
How are these ideas to be implemented? I would like to call on the Georgian
participants to continue their activities in different ways: in Parliament, in gov-
ernmental structures, through publication of articles. We have witnessed com-
plete openness of the participants of this conference which has enhanced the
formation of a strategic community which I mentioned at the beginning of our
seminar. Another means for implementation of the ideas set out here is the active
role of non-governmental organizations. They can arrange further meetings and
communicate with the government and the Parliament. This will contribute to
the development of mutual confidence and the public will take greater interest in
security problems.
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Ia Tikanadze, Head of the Georgian office of the Friedrich Ebert Foun-
dation concluded by speaking of the tasks and future plans of the Founda-
tion with respect to the national security problems.

